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At the heart of American military law are the general
articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Article
134 of the Uniform Code provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken
cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-
martial, according to the nature and degree of the
offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of
that court.
2
Its companion statute, Article 133, states: "Any commis-
sioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be
3punished as a court-martial may direct."
Together, these two statutes incorporate into the
Uniform Code a common law system of military criminal law.
Article 134 prohibits two general classes of misconduct
In this thesis the phrase "general articles" refers
to both Articles 133 and 134 and their antecedents. Con-
temporary usage in the military generally limits "general
article" to Article 134. However, "general articles" is
more accurate since Articles 133 and 134 share common
origins and functions in military law and are both statu-
tory expressions of a system of military common law.
2
Art. 134, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. sec. 934.
3Art. 133, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. sec. 933.

that have been prosecuted by courts-martial for centuries:
conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, known in
contemporary legal jargon as "clause (1) offenses"; and
service-discrediting conduct, commonly known as "clause (2)
offenses". Article 133 forbids a third general class:
"unbecoming" conduct on the part of officers.
Article 134, under its "crimes and offenses not
capital" clause, also acts as an assimilative crimes
statute, under which violations of federal law not specif-
ically covered by one of the punitive articles of the
Uniform Code may be prosecuted. Such "clause (3)" prose-
cutions may also include violations of state criminal
statutes assimilated into the U.S. Code by the Federal
4Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948. While prosecutions
under this third clause of Article 134 can pose interesting
5
and complex issues such as the maximum punishment and the
extent to which similar but not identical provisions in the
Uniform Code preempt prosecutions of "crimes and offenses
not capital", this application of Article 134 is funda-
mentally different from the other three classes of general
articles offenses, and is therefore outside the immediate
4
18 U.S.C. sec. 13.
See , e.g., United States v. Walter, 20 CM. A. 367,
43 C.M.R. 207 (1971); United States v. Picotte, 12 CM. A.
196, 30 C.M.R. 196 (1961)
.
See , e.g., United States v. Wright, 5 M.J. 106
(CM. A. 1978); United States v. Jones, 5 M.J. 579 (A. C.M.R.
1978); United States v. Sellars, 5 M.J. 814 (A. C.M.R. 1977)

scope of this thesis.
Exactly what specific conduct does the vague language
of Articles 133 and 134 forbid? Couched as they are in
terms of discipline, discredit, and standards expected of
officers and gentlemen, Articles 133 and 134 seem to have a
substantive reach that extends beyond perceptible legal
horizons. The current edition of the Manual for Courts-
7Martial lists more than seventy different offenses punish-
g
able under Article 134 alone. These range from abusing a
public animal to wrongful cohabitation, and include offenses
9
carrying substantial penalties. Moreover, the Manual's
enumeration of Article 133 and 134 offenses is by no means
all-inclusive. Over the years military courts have recog-
nized a number of "novel offenses" not mentioned in the
Manual, involving such diverse misconduct as selling
whiskey at an unconscionable price to an enlisted man,
7Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969
(Revised) [hereinafter cited as M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.)] .
o
See the Table of Maximum Punishments and the form
specifications, M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), para. 127c, at 25-15
through 25-17, and app. 6c, at A6-20 through A6-26. The
Manual mentions only ten examples of Article 133 offenses.
Id.
,
para. 212, at 28-70 through 28-71, and app. 6c, at
A6-20.
9 E.g., assault with intent to commit murder or rape
(20 years
-
confinement) ; burning with intent to defraud (10
years) ; wrongful possession, sale, transfer, use, or intro-
duction of habit-forming narcotic drugs (10 years). See
Id.
,
para. 127c, at 25-15 through 15-17.
10United States v. Kupfer, 9 C.M.R. 283 (A.B.R. 1953),
aff'd, 3 CM. A. 478, 13 C.M.R. 34 (1953) .

11 . .12
cheating at cards, having an extramarital affair,
13
operating a dishonest bingo game, and sexual acts with a
chicken.
It is not surprising, then, that the antecedents of
Article 134 have been referred to by soldiers as "the
Devil's Article" and by sailors as "the captain's
J
c
cloak". One of the pioneer commentators on American
military law, William C. DeHart, writing in 1846 about
conduct unbecoming an officer, noted—as have countless
other scholars, lawyers, and court-martial members since
then—that the concept "from the want of a uniform under-
standing of its intention, spirit, and authority, has
occasioned frequent perplexity in the deliberations of
courts-martial, and a consequent diversity in their deci-
17
sions." As early as 1857 the Supreme Court entertained
United States v. West, 16 C.M.R. 587 (A.F.B.R. 1954),
petition for review denied , 4 CM. A. 744, 20 C.M.R. 398
(1954) .
1 United States v. Alcantara, 39 C.M.R. 682 (A.B.R.
1968), aff 'd , 18 CM. A. 372, 40 C.M.R. 84 (1969).
United States v. Holt, 7 CM. A. 617, 23 C.M.R. 81
(1957)
.




G. Davis, A Treatise on the Military Law of the
United States 473, n. 1 (1898)
.




W. DeHart, Observations on Military Law and the




an attack on the Navy's general article on the grounds of
4.-*. 4-- 1 18unconstitutional vagueness.
In this century, as civilian and military courts began
to apply certain of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to
19
court-martial defendants and as the void-for-vagueness
doctrine developed in civilian courts, criticism of the
general articles' apparent vagueness became more pronounced.
Some commentators likened the general articles to a "Catch
21 2222". Article 134 was described as "as study in vagueness",
18 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1357).
19For the most comprehensive account of this develop-
ment, see Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law , 22
Maine L. Rev. 3 (1970) . Such a perceived "civilianization"
of military law, particularly in procedural matters, has also
sparked sharp opposition, such as that expressed in Westmore-
land and Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized Uniform
Code of Military Justice in Combat , 3 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y. 1 (1980) .
20 See generally , Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine
, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970); Note, The Void-for -
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court , 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
67 (1960)
.
21See , e.g., Note, Uniform Code of Military Justice--
The General Article is Unconstitutionally Vague and Over -
board
, 18 St. Louis L.J. 150 (1973); Note, Taps for the
Real Catch-22 , 81 Yale L.J. 1518 (1972) . The ,, Catch-22 ,,
analogy comes from Joseph Heller's novel of the same name:
"We accuse you also of the commission of crimes and
infractions we don't even know about yet. Guilty
or innocent?"
"I don't know, sir. How can I say if you don't tell
me what they are?"
"How can we tell you if we don't know?"
J. Heller, Catch-22 395 (Dell ed., 1970).
22 Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military
Justice—A Study In" Vagueness , 37 N. Car . L~^ Rev. 142
(1959) . Mr. Everett is currently the Chief Judge of the
U.S. Court of Military Appeals.

23 . 24
"elemental confusion", and "an unrestricted anachronism".
By the early 1970s even persons who could fairly be consid-
ered friends of the military justice system began to call
for the repeal of Articles 133 and 134. In Justice Under
Fire
,
a generally favorable survey of military justice,
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., offered the following typical
friendly criticism of the general articles:
Constitutional or not, the general articles in their
present form seem at best unnecessary. There is no
need to punish ungentlemanly conduct as a crime, even
if there were universal agreement on standards of
conduct among gentlemen. If an officer displays
traits of character which make him unfit to command--
and it may be remarked in passing that Alexander,
Julius Caesar, and Napoleon were none of them paragons
of veracity, chastity, and sobriety--he can be elim-
inated from the service without being convicted of
crime. The genuine crimes usually charged under the
general articles could as easily, and with much
clearer constitutionality, be covered by explicit
articles of the Code. One such article, for example,
might simply replace the "crimes not capital" clause
of Article 134 by incorporating by reference the
federal penal code. If Congress wants to court-
martial military personnel who indulge in cheating at
cards or indecent acts with children (with a service
connection) , it might just as well say so explicitly,
whether or not the courts compel it to do so. 25
23Hagan, The General Article—Elemental Confusion
,
10 Mil. L. Rev. 63 (1960) .
24Comment, The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An
Unrestricted Anachronism , 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 8 31 (1971)
.
5
J. Bishop, Justice Under Fire 90-91 (1974) . See
also , Hodson, Perspective: The Manual for Courts-Martial
— 1934
, 57 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1972). Ma jor-General
Hodson was, at the time, Chief Judge of the U.S. Army Court
of Military Review.

In 1974 the Supreme Court decided the vagueness issue
26
in Parker v. Levy , upholding the general articles against
vagueness and overbreadth challenges.
Captain Levy was an Army doctor assigned to train
Special Forces medical aides. He refused to perform this
duty because he opposed American military operations in
Vietnam, where the aides would serve. Instead he made a
number of anti-war statements to enlisted personnel at his
post, saying, among other things, that if he were a black
soldier he would refuse to go to Vietnam and that Special
Forces personnel were liars, thieves, killers of peasants,
and murderers of women and children. Levy was convicted
by a general court-martial of making a disloyal statement,
in violation of Article 134, and of conduct unbecoming an
officer arising from those statements, in violation of
27Article 133. He was sentenced to dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confine-
ment at hard labor for three years.
417 U.S. 733 (1974). Parker v. Levy is one of the
most important military law cases ever decided. Not only
did it resolve the vagueness issue, but it also announced
a distinctly military rule of standing to challenge punitive
articles of the Uniform Code on the grounds of vagueness or
overbreadth. The court held that Levy lacked standing to
challenge the facial vagueness and overbreadth of Articles
133 and 134, notwithstanding their direct burden on First
Amendment rights, because they were neither vague nor over-
broad as applied to his disloyal statements.
27The lengthy specifications upon which Captain Levy
was tried are set out in a footnote to the Court's opinion.
Id. at 738, n. 5, and 739, n. 6.

After numerous appeals within the military justice
2 8
system and in civilian courts, the Third Circuit invali-
dated his conviction, holding that Articles 133 and 134
were, on their face, unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
"as measured by contemporary standards of vagueness appli-
. . . 29
cable to statutes and ordinances governing civilians."
The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, reversed in
a decison that rested upon several important assumptions
about the nature and operation of the general articles in
military law, and about the military justice system
generally.
The starting point for Justice Rehnquist 's analysis
was the invocation of the "separate society" tradition, a
historic view of the military as being "by necessity a
. . . 30
specialized society, separate from civilian society."
The military exists to fight wars; therefore its society is
governed by values, traditions, and needs that are distinct
from, and to large extent irrelevant in American civilian
society. Moreover, as the military is a separate society,
United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (A.B.R. 1968),
petition for review denied , 18 CM. A. 627 (1969) : Levy v.
Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (1967)/ application for stay denied ,
387 U.S. 915 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert , denied , 389 U.S. 960
(1967); Levy v. Resor, 17 CM. A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967);
Levy v. Resor, 384 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1967), cert , denied
,
389 U.S. 1049 (1968); Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593 (D.
Kan. 1968), aff'd , 415 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1969).
29Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772 (3rd Cir. 1973).
30 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 743.

so too military law "is a jurisprudence which exists
separate and apart from the law which governs in our
31federal judicial establishment."
An even more significant premise, for purposes of
this thesis, was the restrictive role seen for custom of
the service in defining general articles law. Over the
years the military has developed what "may not unfitly be
32
called the customary military law", under which, has
since at least the seventeenth century, offenses now cogni-
zable under the general articles of the Uniform Code have
33been prosecuted. Long-standing customs and usages
"impart accepted meaning to the seemingly imprecise
34
standards" of the general articles. In short, custom,
operating within a common law type of system of military
justice has limited the apparent sweep of the general
articles. They are "gauged by an actual knowledge and
35
experience of military life, its usages and duties."
Moreover, military case law has, according to Justice
Id. at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953) .
32 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 744, quoting Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 35 (1827).
33See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 745-46 for a brief





Id. at 749, quoting Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct.




Rehnquist, had two effects on the substantive scope of the
general articles: "It has narrowed the very broad reach of
the literal language of the articles, and at the same time
has supplied considerable specificity by way of examples of
the conduct which they cover." Justice Rehnquist thus
viewed custom and legal precedent as complementary limiting
forces; to the extent that case precedent has not defined
the general articles, their scope has been defined and
37limited by custom and usage.
This thesis will examine the role of custom in the
development of military general articles law. The prin-
cipal thrust of the inquiry is historical for two reasons.
First, Anglo-American military law began as the enforcement
of military and naval discipline, as embodied in the
ancient and customary "laws of war" and "laws of the sea".
Over the intervening eight centuries, Anglo-American
military law has retained what are essentially military
common law offenses through the general articles of the
military penal codes.
The second reason for a retrospective approach is
that during the formative years of American general
articles law, from the Civil War until World War I, custom
was invoked in a common law fashion to extend the substan-
tive reach of the general articles by recognizing new
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 754.
37




offenses. By 1920 modern general articles law had emerged.
After tracing the historical development of the three
classes of general articles offenses, the thesis will
consider the operation of custom in general articles law
since the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Case law and precedent have had some limiting effect on the
scope of the general articles; but, since 1957, the expansive
effect of service custom has been rejeuvenated somewhat by
the return to the historic practice of treating the
applicability of a general article to the accused's




II. THE EVOLUTION AND PRESERVATION OF
MILITARY COMMON LAW
A. Characteristics of a Common Law
System of Criminal Law
Although Anglo-American systems of military justice
have been based on statutes such as the Uniform Code of
Military Justice since the late seventeenth century, the
general articles of the various military codes have retained
an ancient body of customary military law that operates much
like a common law system of criminal law. Indeed, the
phrase "military common law" is not an inaccurate descrip-
tion of the way that the general articles have operated
38
within the larger statutory framework of military law.
Two fundamental characteristics of a common law system of
crimes make this description appropriate: the use of
custom as a source of substantive criminal law, and the
recognition of new crimes at common law.
Common law crimes arose from custom. Rollin Perkins,
perhaps the foremost modern commentator on criminal law,
has pointed out that "By usage and custom certain rules
come to be accepted both for settling ordinary disputes




or controversies between man and man and for dealing with
those who commit misdeeds of a seriously antisocial
39
nature." The antiquity of a customary characterization
of certain conduct as injurious to a societal interest
itself provides authority for enforcing that custom with
40penal sanctions. Even though its origins are lost in the
mists of antiquity, custom derives its force "from the fact
that it has existed and been accepted as the law from time
41 . . .immemorial." What constitutes criminal conduct is thus
determined by custom, as evidenced by legal tradition and
42precedent, scholarly commentary, and treatises.
43Custom, although ancient, is not static. Inter-
woven with custom, and to a considerable extent shaping its
use, are the legal and societal contexts in which it is
39
R. Perkins, Criminal Law 24 (2d ed . 1969)
.
40 Blackstone found that the force of the common law
"rests entirely upon general reception and usage; and the
only method of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of
the common law, is by showing that it hath been always the
custom to observe it." 4 Blackstone' s Commentaries *68,
quoted in R. Perkins, supra note 39.
41
W. Clark, Handbook of Criminal Law 17-18 (2d ed.
1902) .
42
W. Clark and W. Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of
Crimes 23-24 (5th ed. 1952) .
43Rollin Perkins has written: "Courts are constantly
required to pass upon new problems, partly due to changing
social and economic conditions. They are required to
decide what is the common law as applied to these new prob-
lems and in this way they make constant additions to the
field.
. .Hence the common law is a constantly growing body
of material." R. Perkins, supra note 39, at 25.

14
applied, as well as ethical and moral principles and public
44policy considerations. This leads to the second impor-
tant attribute of a common law system of criminal law; the
judicial recognition of new common law offenses, i.e.,
conduct not hitherto criminally punished. This process is
essentially one of effects analysis, and was described by
William L. Clark in language suggestive in tone of that in
Article 134 of the Uniform Code: "The common law punishes
acts tending to a breach of the public peace, acts injuri-
ous to the public morals, and acts having certain other
tendencies. Any acts, therefore, which have such effect
45
are prohibited by the common law." The test, then is
not just one of legal precedent, but whether, apply cus-
tomary values and norms, the conduct injuriously affects
,, . - . 46public policy or economy.
As this thesis now turns to a historical analysis of
the general articles offenses, these two important charac-
teristics of a common law system--the reliance on and
enforcement of custom, and the elasticity of the substan-
tive limits of military common law provided by the
44 See J. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 87-
88 (1909); see generally E. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men
and Ideas of the Law 212-17 (1953) .
45
W. Clark, supra note 41, at 22.
46
E. McClain, A Treatise on the Criminal Law as Now
Administered in the United States 19-20 (1897) . McClain
expressed the test simply: "All crimes that injuriously
affect public society are indictable at common law." Id .
at 19, n. 5.

15
recognition of novel general articles of fenses--will serve
as marker threads running intertwined through the develop-
ment of military common law from early times to the present,
B. The British Origins of Military Common Law
1. The Antiguity of Military Common Law
The modern American military justice system is the
product of more than 800 years 1 development, during which
military law has retained at its core attributes and values
of the system of customary law from which it emerged in the
twelfth century. Although some scholars have traced the
. . . . 47
substantive origins of modern military law to Phoenician,
48 49
Roman, and Frankish sources, the earliest clearly
identifiable appearance of the system of customary military
law now embodied in Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform
Code was in medieval England.
British military legal history is essential to an
understanding of contemporary American military law in this
47 See J. Stephens, C. Gifford, and F. Smith, Manual
of Naval Law and Court Martial Procedure 14 (4th ed . 1912)
[hereinafter cited as J. Stephens et a_l.] ; see generally
W. McFee, The Law of the Sea 33-66 (1951) .
48 See G. Davis, supra note 15, at 13; Graynor,
Prejudicial and Discreditable Military Conduct: A Critical
Appraisal of the General Article
,
22 Hastings L.J. 259, 260
(1971)
.
49 See W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 17-18
(2d ed. 1896) (1920 reprint) . Pagination cited is that of
the 1920 reprint, which is more commonly shelved in law
libraries than the 1896 printing.

16
area. Although one major nineteenth century American
commentator, William C. DeHart, seemed to dismiss British
precedents and legal history as irrelevant to American
military law, that view has been almost universally
rejected. The first American military codes were deliber-
ately patterned after contemporary British military
articles, with large portions of the British models being
51 . .
adopted verbatim by the Continental Congress. British
military law, including that of the post-Revolutionary
period, had a marked influence on the development of
. . . . 52American military law in the nineteenth century.
W. DeHart, supra note 17, at 1. Notwithstanding
his dismissal of British military precedent, DeHart relied
on British military law in discussing conduct unbecoming
an officer. Id. at 375-76.
51
E. Byrne, Military Law 4-8 (2d ed . 1976)
.
Frederick Bernays Wiener has pointed out: "It must never
be forgotten that the men of the American revolution were
revolutionary only to a point; they retained the English
language, they retained the English common law, they
shaped their legislative institutions after English models,
while in military matters they not only retained intact the
English hierarchy of rank, from private to general, but
copied verbatim the English articles of war." Wiener, Are
the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague ?,
54" A. B.A.J. 357, 358 (1968) .
52Nineteenth century American military law treatises
devoted significant attention to British antecedents and
precedents. See , e.g., G. Davis, supra note 15, at 3-14,
468; W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 18-21. British
military cases were also consulted and considered author-
itative on some issues. See , e.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116




Military law developed as separate but similar
53
systems of army and naval law. In both services, however,
the historical purpose of military law was the preservation
of discipline. One scholar of naval history has summarized
the absolute importance of discipline as follows:
The governing of a fighting force throughout history
has had a general continuity through acceptance of the
theory that military success lies in having a fighting
body of men respond as a unit in applying its force to
an enemy... To compel obedience, to insure cohesion and
integrity of the fighting unit was seen as the function
of military law and discipline. 54
Indeed, the feature of military law that made it a
separate system of jurisprudence has been its bedrock value
of the preservation of discipline. General C. J. Napier,
writing in 1837, distinguished military lav; from civilian
law on the basis of military law "having for its object to
make the will of a single man the paramount rule" while
civilian law had for its purpose "to prevent the will of a
55
single man being the rule." The critical importance of
53Before the enactment of the Uniform Code—and even
today in Great Britian— "military law" referred strictly
only to the army court-martial system, with the navy's
system being known as "naval law". In this thesis, however,
"military law" will be used in its modern American sense,
referring to the army and naval systems together.
54 . .
J. Van Slate, A History of Naval Military Law 2
(September 1971) (unpublished LL.M. thesis; George Wash-
ington University). Captain Van Slate's thesis contains an
outstanding exposition of the role of discipline in mili-
tary law at 2-13.
C. Napier, Remarks on Military Law 5 (1837) , quoted
in J. Van Slate, supra note 54, at 5.

18
discipline in the military, caused General W. T. Sherman to
state that military and civilian societies are "as wide
apart as the poles, and each requires its own separate
system of laws—statute and common."
Even since the enactment of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice in 1950, the enforcement of discipline
remains a principal justification for a separate system of
military justice. The drafters of the Uniform Code consid-
ered it to be a fair compromise between the traditional
function of preserving discipline and the post-World War II
desire to introduce civilian concepts of procedural justice
57to prevent abuses. The ancient role of military law,
however, remains its raison d'etre. As Robinson 0. Everett,
now Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, wrote
in 1956:
Military justice is a system of law created to enforce
certain standards of behavior--some of them identical
with standards enforced in civilian life--which have
importance in maintaining discipline in the Armed
Forces and public respect for those Forces. The
administration of the system is placed in the hands of
military courts of one type or another chiefly for two
reasons. One is that to do so is more convenient and
in some situations is the only feasible alternative.
The other is that these military courts are closer to
56
W. Sherman, Military Law 130 (1880)
,
quoted in
J. Van Slate, supra note 54, at 5.
57Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on S.
857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Comm. on Armed Services , 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1949)






the problems of maintaining discipline and assessing
appropriate punishment than a civil court would be. 58
Long before the first written military penal codes
appeared in Britain, discipline and order were enforced
according to the customs and traditions of martial and
naval discipline. Great authority reposed in the com-
manding officer, who administered and enforced discipline
in a somewhat summary fashion, as had been the custom since
59Roman and Teutonic times. Under ancient maritime custom
English sailors, whether in the merchant fleet or in the
King's service, were subject to virtually life-and-death
disciplinary authority vested in their commanders.
Written military codes did not appear in England
until the close of the twelfth century. The first British
58
R. Everett, Military Justice in the Armed Forces of
the United States 7 (19 56) . A number of commentators have
recently published thoughtful challenges to the continued
primacy of discipline in military law. See , e.g., Zillman
and Imwinkelnied, Constitutional Rights and Military Neces -
sity: Reflections on the Society Apart , 51 Notre Dame Law.
396 (19 76)1 Comment, Military Discipline and Political Ex -
pression: A New Look at an Old Bugbear , 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 525, 537-44 (1971); Sherman, supra note 19, at
78-85.
59
W. Wmthrop, supra note 49, at 17.
6
J. Stephens et. a_l. , supra note 47, at 1-4. Even as
relatively recently as the early nineteenth century, an
American sailor remarked: "No monarch in the world is more
absolute than the captain of a man-of-war." G. Brooks, ed .
,
James Durand: An Able Seaman of 1812 18 (1926)
,
quoted in




code was the ordinance promulgated by Richard I in 1190
to govern his fleet on its expedition in the Crusades. Its
provisions were brief, but severe:
Richard, by the grace of God, King of England, Duke of
Normandy and Aquitaine, and Earl of Anjou, to all his
subjects about to proceed by sea to Jersusalem,
greeting. Know ye, that we, with the common consent
of fit and proper men, have made the enactments under-
written. Whoever shall slay a man on ship-board, he
shall be bound to the dead man and thrown into the sea.
If he shall slay him on land he shall be bound to the
dead man and buried in the earth. If any one shall be
convicted, by means of lawful witnesses, of having
drawn out a knife with which to strike another, or
shall strike another so as to draw blood, he shall
lose his hand. If, also, he shall give a blow with
his hand, without shedding blood, he shall be plunged
in the sea three times. If any man shall utter dis-
graceful language or abuse, or shall curse his companion,
he shall pay him an ounce of silver for every time he
has so abused him. A robber who shall be convicted of
theft shall have his head cropped after the manner of
a champion, and boiling pitch shall be poured thereon,
and then the feathers of a cushion shall be shaken out
upon him so that he may be known, and at the first
land at which the ship shall touch, he shall be set on
shore. Witness myself, at Chinon.62
A similar code, consisting of 27 articles, was promulgated
by Richard II in 1385 for the army. It emphasized conduct
that could be considered detrimental to military discipline,
ft l
The ordinance of 1190 was apparently modeled after
the Code Nautique d'Oleron issued by Eleanor of Aquitaine,
the wife of King Henry II of England, earlier in the
twelfth century. The Code Nautique was itself derived from
the more ancient customary law of the seas, particularly




Naval Ordinance of 1190, reprinted in W. Winthrop,
supra note 49, app. I, at 903.
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such as going on an expedition without permission, aban-
64doning the watch, and granting unauthorized safe conduct
and violating an authorized one.
These early ordinances were not intended to be com-
plete catalogues of military offenses and punishments.
Instead, it appears that their principal purpose was to
give notice to commanders and soldiers and sailors alike of
the kinds of misconduct prohibited by the customary law of
war and law of the sea. It must be remembered that until
6 "5
"XIV. ITEM, that no man go out on an expedition by
night or day, unless with the knowledge and by the permis-
sion of the chieftain of the battail in which he is, so
that they may be able to succour him should occasion re-
quire it, on pain of losing horse and armour." Articles of
War of 1385, art. XIV, reprinted in W. Winthrop, supra note
49, app. II, at 905.
64
"XX. ITEM, that every one shall well and duly
perform his watch in the army, and with the number of men
at arms and archers as is assigned him, and that he shall
remain the full limited term, unless by order or permission
of him before whom the watch is made, on pain of having his
head cut off." Articles of War of 1385, art. XX, reprinted
in id .
"XXI. ITEM, that no one shall give passports or
safe conduct to a prisoner nor any other, nor leave to any
enemy to come into the army, on pain of forfeiture of all
his goods to the King, and his body in arrest and at his
will; except our lord the King, Monsieur de Lancaster,
seneschall, the constable, and marshall : and that none be
so hardy as to violate the safe conduct of our lord the
king, upon payne of being drawn and hanged, and his goods
and heritage forfeited to the King; nor to infringe the
safe conducts of our said lord of Lancaster, seneschall,
constable, and mareschall, upon pain of being beheaded."
Articles of War of 1385, art. XXI, reprinted in id.
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the end of the sixteenth century, the British army and navy
were not permanent organizations. Instead, when it be-
came necessary to execute a military expedition the Earl
Marshall and Lord High Admiral would raise an army and
fleet respectively, and would issue, often through the
commanders-in-chief, articles providing for army and naval
fi 7discipline. Although each code was in effect only for a
single war or expedition, one would usually be reissued
68
with only minor changes in subsequent wars. As a result
of the ad hoc raising of military forces, although there
existed a fairly well-defined body of customary army and
naval law, most of the soldiers and sailors and even many
of the officers in any given expedition were largely igno-
rant of its provisions. Of course, a prerequisite of
effective military discipline was that those under its
authority should know what behavior is inconsistent with
discipline and order.
Evidence that the primary purpose of these early
codes was notice can be found in the requirement that their
provisions be read or posted. The practice probably pre-
dates the twelfth century, but the ordinance of 1190
included instructions that it be copied out in parchment
and nailed to the foremast of each ship in Richard I's
J. Stephens et al_. , supra note 47, at 5.
f> 7
Id. i Manual of Military Law (British) 7-9 (1887).
ft R
J. Stephens et al., supra note 47, at 5.
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fleet. Since many of the officers and most of the crews
were illiterate, it was also to be read monthly at a muster
69
of all hands. The practice has been consistently
observed in the British and American military from medieval
times to the present.
Early military law was customary law. In the common
law tradition, conduct that was injurious to discipline
was an offense against military law. The codes merely
served to provide notice to those largely unaware of mili-
tary custom and, in some instances, to provide uniform
punishment.
69Naval Court-Martial Manual, supra note 61, at vin.
70 . ...Henry VIII required similar notice provisions in
his Book of Orders for the War by Sea and Land issued in
1532. M. Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy 26
(1896) . In 1758 Parliament enacted legislation requiring
that the naval articles of 1749 be posted in a public part
of each ship, be constantly maintained and revised, and be
read once a month in the presence of the officers and crew.
31 Geo. 2, c. 10, sec. 33 (1758). The purpose of these
provisions was summarized in 1813 as follows: "Hence, no
officer or seaman is allowed to plead ignorance of the
penalties and punishments to which he is liable, from
neglect or disobedience, nor can be be unacquainted with
the encouragements and benefits to which seamen are
entitled, by a due and faithful performance of their duty.
1 J. McArthur, Principles and Practice of Naval and Military
Courts Martial 44 (4th ed. London 1812) . See also W.
Winthrop, supra note 49, at 764, concerning origins of
similar requirements in army law. The current notice re-
quirements are set forth in Art. 137, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C.
sec. 937, which provides that the punitive articles of the
Code "shall be carefully explained to each enlisted member
at the time of his entrance on active duty, or within six
days thereafter. They shall be explained again after he
has completed six months of active duty, and again at the
time when he reenlists. A complete text of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and of the regulations prescribed
by the President thereunder shall be made available to any





2. The First General Articles
It was not until the early fourteenth century that
the first codification of military common law was attempted
In the early 1330s, King Edward III established the Court
71
of Admiralty under Sir John Beauchamp, the first Lord
High Admiral. Under his direction, the Inquisition of
Queensborough compiled the first codification of naval
customary law, "The Ancient Statutes of the Admiralty to be
Observed Upon the Ports and Havens, the High Seas, and
Beyond the Seas". Compiled between 1337 and 1351, this
collection of naval law became known simply as the "Black
Book of the Admiralty" because of its black leather
binding. Its articles were derived from both contemporary
and ancient maritime custom, and from earlier naval codes
such as the Code Nautique d 'Qleron and the ordinance of
721190. It also contained the first general article in
English military law, Article 11, which clearly expressed
the customary nature of naval law:
Item, that no captain or master of ship shall suffer
any mariner of his ship to be ill used or beaten, but
if any mariner doth trespass or do any thing against
the ordinance or law of the sea then the captain or
master shall send or bring such mariner offending
71The Court of Admiralty originally exercised exclu-
sive jurisdiction over piracy, prize, and admiralty law;
but at no time did it control naval policy, administration,
or discipline. Its criminal jurisdiction over piracy was
transferred to the Central Criminal Court in 1834, and the
court itself was merged into the Probate, Divorce, and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice in 1875.





before the admiral or underadmiral there to undergo
and receive what the law and custom of the sea wills
and requires. 73
The Black Book of the Admiralty remained an author-
itative source of naval common law for more than three
centuries. As late as 1532 the ancient naval punishment
74
of suspension was still being employed. During the
English expedition against Cadiz in 1596, the penalty of
binding a murderer to his victim and casting him overboard,
75described in the 1190 ordinance, was still being executed.
When the first general articles appeared in English
military codes, they did so in the context of an ancient
but active body of military common law. The purpose of
the general articles was to act as a savings clause,
incorporating military common law into the codes and
providing notice that, in addition to the more serious
military offenses enumerated in the codes, members of the
armed forces were also subject to penal sanctions for
misconduct customarily recognized as injurious to discipline
73
1 Black Book of the Admiralty xxx-xxi (Twiss ed
.
1871) . The use of the singular form of the verbs "will"
and "require" suggests that "the law and custom of the sea"
was considered a single, indivisible entity: the law of
the sea being maritime custom having the force of law.
74
M. Oppenheim, supra note 70, at 79. Suspension was
imposed for sleeping on watch. The culprit was suspended
in a basket from the bowsprit and given a biscuit, a can of
beer, and a knife. He was then left to starve or to cut
himself down into the sea.
75




The first general articles merely invoked custom in
general terms. The ordinance of 16 25, promulgated by the
Earl of Essex and Lord Wimbledon for an expedition against
Cadiz, instructed commanders to punish "any other crime or
offense" with due severity in the punishment or reformation
thereof according to the known orders of the sea."
Articles of war issued that same year for the army likewise
provided that "All other disorders whatsoever are to be
77punished, as these formerly nominated."
The 1627 army articles not only indicated that army
customary law was to govern, but also suggested the role of
the court-martial members, then known as a council of war,
in determining whether the accused's conduct was punishable
under army custom: "All other abuses and offences not
specified in these Orders shall be punished according to
the disciplines of warr and opinions of such officers and
7 8
others as shall be called to make a Councell of Warr."
The articles issued in 1635 by the Earl of Lindsay,
in his capacity as Lord High Admiral, likewise vested
discretion in the commander to determine whether the
accused's actions were contrary to naval customary law:
76
J. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816, 29
Navy Records Society 36 (190 5) .
77
Nichols, The Devil's Article , 22 Mil. L. Rev. Ill,





Secondly: If any under your command in that ship
shall be a common swearer, blasphemer, railer,
drunkard, pilferer, or sleep at his watch, or make
a noise, and not betake himself to his place of
rest, after the watch is set, or shall not keep his
cabin cleanly, or be discontented with his proportion
of victuals, or shall spoil or waste them, or any
other necessary provisions for the ship, or shall
commit any insolvency or disorder, fitting by you
to be corrected, you are to punish them according
to the order and custom of the sea .
^
The Earl Marshall's articles of 1639 provided still
another wording, but to the same effect of preserving
customary military law:
In whatever cases or accidents that may occurre, for
which there is no speciall order set downe in the
lawes here published, there the ancient course of
marshall discipline shall be observed untill such
time as his Excellence the Lord General shall cause
further order to be made and published in the Armie,
which shall thence forward stand in force upon the
paines therein expressed. 80
The Earl of Northumberland's general article of 1640
was typical of language used by both Royalist and Parlia-
mentary forces during the English Civil War: "All other
faults, disorders and offences, not mentioned in these
articles shall be punished according to the general customes
81
and laws of warre." Identical language was used in the













the Parliamentary army, in 1642, and in the Articles for
33
the Government of the Navy of 1652.
3. The Impact of Seventeenth Century
Constitutional Developments
The mid-seventeenth century is an important period in
the development of both military common law, as embodied in
the general articles, and the court-martial system gener-
ally. By the mid-seventeenth century general articles were
a feature of every British military code. Notwithstanding
the profound constitutional changes that would occur in the
seventeenth century, military common law and the customs
upon which it was based were retained, even though more
extensive and detailed military penal codes were issued.
Military law in this era retained a strong common law
flavor, as was characteristically expressed in the Articles
of War of 164 3: "Matters, that are clear by the light and
law of nature, are presupposed; things unnecessary are
passed over in silence; and other things may be judged by
the common customs and constitutions of war; or may upon
84
new emergents, be expressed afterwards." Moreover, by
1653 most of the substantive and procedural concepts and
institutions that were to govern the British military, and
o 2See Nichols, supra note 77, at 113; J. Snedeker,
supra note 16, at 398.
8j
Id. at 399.
84Nichols, supra note 77, at 113, quoting 2 F. Grose,




which would be adopted by and influence American military
law, were identifiable, particularly the authority of the
p c
court-martial itself as a judicial organ.
Although Parliament's triumph over the Crown in the
seventeenth century changed the constitutional basis of
British military law from royal prerogative to statute, it
did not curtail the operation of military common law.
Military codes issued during the Commonwealth, after the
Restoration, and even after the final Parliamentary triumph
of 1688, routinely contained general articles authorizing
p c
punishment of customary military offenses. Moreover,
while Parliament's distaste for Cromwell's military
dictatorship resulted in temporary restrictions on the
court-martial system immediately after the Restoration, by
the end of the seventeenth century Parliament had become
content to allow military law to return to flowing rela-
tively unimpeded along its ancient channels.
By 1660 Cromwell's excesses had caused Parliament to
regard a standing army as a threat to its authority, and,
in a broader sense, to liberty. Thus, during the Resto-
ration, royal authority over military law was at first
8 5For an excellent summary of the emergence of the
court-martial as a judicial organ during this period, see
J. Van Slate, supra 54, at 26-40.
p r
The "Prince Rupert Articles" of 1672, which were in
effect from March 1672 through February 1674, had no general
article and are a curious exception. See G. Davis, supra
note 15, at 567 et seq.
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sharply curtailed. The Articles for the Government of
Guards and Garrisons of 1662, for example, removed felonies
from court-martial jurisdiction, requiring that felonies
committed by soldiers be tried under civil common law by a
special commission convened under the Great Seal and acting
8 7
with the advice of civilian judges and lawyers. By 16S6,
Parliament had relented to the extent of fully restoring
court-martial jurisdiction to its pre-1660 limits, but
required that the Articles of War promulgated by James II
that year expressly prohibit infliction of any peacetime
p Q
punishment amounting to loss of life or limb.
One of the effects of Parliamentary restrictions on
the authority of the army to punish its offenders was that
89by 1638 discipline had deteriorated to alarming depths
.
J
After James II was deposed, the lingering threat of a
Jacobite insurrection precipitated a restoration of the
disciplinary authority of the Crown, subject to Parlia-
mentary assent. In March 1689, 800 soldiers mutinied at
Ipswich and marched on London to restore James II.
n
-j
iManual of Military Law, supra note 67, at 12.
8 8
Id . : "Rules and Articles for the Better Government
of His Majesties Land-Forces in Pay", art. LXIV (1586),
reprinted in W. Winthrop, supra note 49, app. V, at 928.
Winthrop incorrectly dated these articles as 1683, although
they were in force in that year. This has resulted in
considerable confusion about their date of promulgation.
See
, e.g ., J. Snedeker, supra note 16, at 899.
39Manual of Military Law, supra note 67, at 12.
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Parliament responded by passing the Mutiny Act of April 3,
901689, so named for its caption "An Act for punishing
Officers or Soldiers who shall Mutiny or Desert their
Majestyes Service". The Mutiny Act was a remarkable piece
of legislation, given the constitutional and political
upheavals that England had experienced shortly before its
enactment. While expressly recognizing that ,: the raising
or keeping a standing Army within this Kingdome in time of
peace unlesse it be with consent of Parlyament is against
91Law", and that ''noe man may be forejudged of Life or
Limbe, or subjected to any Kinde of punishment by Martiall
Lav;, or in any other manner than by judgment of his Peeres,
and according to the Knowne and Established Laws of this
92Realme", Parliament expressed the need for extraordinary
action:
Yet, nevertheless, it being requisite for retaineing
such Forces as are or shall be raised dureing this
exigence of Affaires in their Duty an exact Discipline
be observed. And that Soldiers who shall Mutiny or
Stirr up Sedition, or shall desert Their Majestyes
Service be brought to a more exemplary and speedy Q3
Punishment than the usuall forms of Law will allow."
90
1 William & Mary, c. 5. For an account of the
mutiny of April 16 89, see 1 J. McArthur, supra note 70, at
22-23; Manual of Military Law, supra note 67, at 12.
91Mutiny Act of April 1689, 1 William & Mary, c. 5,










The Crown was therefore granted the authority to cause
courts-martial to be convened under articles of war promul-
94gated by the sovereign. Such articles already were in
effect, those issued by James II in 1686. Thus, Parliament
used James II 's own rules to defeat his insurrection.
Reflecting the British constitutional abhorrence of a
standing army, the original Mutiny Act was enacted for a
95period of only seven months. However, it was extended in
96November 1689 and would be renewed annually, except for
97
an interruption from April 1698 to February 1701, until
1879, when it was merged with the Articles of War into a
9 8
single Army Discipline Act.
The Mutiny Act therefore established a three-tiered
structure of army substantive law. The constitutional
foundation of British army law was no longer royal prerog-
ative, but an act of Parliament. The articles of war,
94
W. Winthrop, supra note 49m at 47; G. Davis, supra
note 15, at 3. This power was implied in the authorization
in section 3 of the Mutiny Act to grant commissions for the
convening of courts-martial.
95Mutiny Act of April 1689, 1 William and Mary, c. 5,
sec. 3.
96
1 William and Mary, sess. 2, c. 4 (1689)
.
97
1 J. McArthur, supra note 70, at 23.
98 42 & 43 Vict., c. 32 (1879). The annual authoriza-
tion of the existence of the British Army continued, how-
ever, until the passage of the Army Act of May 6, 1955, 3 &
4 Eliz. 2, c. 20. That act was originally effective for
only one year, but provided that the Parliamentary authori-
zation for the army could be continued by order of the
Privy Council for a period of not more than five years.
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9 9issued by the Crown until 180 3, set out substantive and
procedural military law and constituted the second tier.
The third tier was the ancient military common law, which
was incorporated into the articles of war by general arti-
cles, such as that issued by George II in 1765:
All Crimes not Capital, and all Disorders or Neglects,
which Officers and Soldiers may be guilty of, to the
Prejudice of good Order and Military Discipline,
though not mentioned in the above Articles of War, are
to be taken Cognizance of by a Court-Martial , and be
punished at their Discretion. 100
Parliament treated naval law somewhat differently.
Once Parliament gained control of the British navy during
the Interregnum, it never returned it to the Crown. During
the Commonwealth, the Navy was managed directly by a Par-
liamentary committee, which in April 164 5, promulgated "An
ordinance and articles concerning martial law for the
government of the navy", enumerating a number of specific
offenses and directing punishment of unspecified naval
offenses according to the "known orders and customs of the
sea". From 1648 through 1653 Parliament gradually returned
some administrative powers to the admirals, but kept the
99Commencing in 1803 army articles of war were issued
by act of Parliament. 53 Geo. 3, c. 17, sec. 146 (1803)
.
Rules and Articles for the Better Government of Our
Horse and Foot Guards, and All Other Our Forces in Our
Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Dominions Beyond the
Seas, and Foreign Parts, sec. XX, art. Ill (1765), reprinted
in W. Winthrop, supra note 49, app. VII, at 946 [hereinafter
cited as Articles of War of 176 5] , The Articles of War of
1774 had a similarly worded general article. See G. Davis,
supra note 15, at 567.
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navy on a fairly short leash. After the Restoration,
Parliament confirmed the Crown's general authority over the
102 . . . ...
navy, but naval administration and discipline were to be
governed, except in mundane matters, by legislation. Thus,
the "Articles and Orders for the Regulation and better
Government of his Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and
Forces by Sea" of 1661 and all subsequent naval codes
were enacted by Parliament, not issued by royal decree.
The British navy was thus governed by a two-tiered
system of substantive law: the naval articles enacted by
Parliament and the customary naval offenses retained by the
general articles of those codes. Article 33 of the 1661
code, for example, provided that "all other faults,
misdemeanors, and disorders committed at sea, not mentioned
in this act shall be punished according to the laws and
104
customs in such cases used at sea." The ancient law of
the sea, preserved by the general articles, had thus
J. Stephens et a_l . , supra note 47, at 14-15.
102
13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3 (1661).
103
13 Car. 2, c. 89 (1661)
.
10 4
Id. , art XXXIII. J.E.R. Stephens et al . state
that little is known about the circumstances of
-
the enact-
ment of the naval articles of 1661, but that a growing
diversity among the regulations and articles issued by
various naval commanders probably prompted the legislation.
They point out that, unlike the army, the British navy was
a permanent institution, and that a permanent code was
necessary for Parliament to maintain control over the navy,
which was not subject to annual authorization. J. Stephens
et al., supra note 47, at 18-19.
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survived the upheaval of the seventeenth century and the
* , , . 105demise of royal prerogative.
Two aspects of the seventeenth century development
of military law are particularly important to this inquiry.
First, although Parliament had the opportunity, both during
the Commonwealth and in 1688, to make all military offenses
purely statutory, it instead retained virtually unaltered
the military common law that was, by that time, already
some five centuries old. Since many of the members of
Parliament were common law lawyers, this may not be partic-
ularly surprising. Secondly, it would appear that the
reason why custom was retained as a source of military law
was deference to the military commander's judgment, exer-
cised through the officers he appointed to serve on the
court-martial, as to what conduct was violative of military
custom. John McArthur, writing in 1813, exclaimed, "This,
as Sir William Blackstone observes, is a vast and important
trust: an unlimited power to create crimes, and annex to
them any punishments not extending to life or limb."
The general articles in the military codes were, according
to McArthur, a conscious recognition of the special needs
of military society:
105 . .The seagoing nature of the navy's mission seemed
to allow customary punishments to linger as well. Penalties
such as flogging, keelhauling, ducking, spread-eagling in
the rigging, and wearing a wooden collar--all purely cus-
tomary punishments
—
persisted well into the eighteenth
century. 1 J. McArthur, supra note 70, at 327-332.





In these naval and military articles we see the
defects of human wisdom discretely supplied
and anticipated by general sweeping clauses, applying
the punishment of those offenses which were not
foreseen by the legislature at the time of legislation,
and which could not, therefore, be specifically
provided against; and in order that justice may not be
retarded in its course, nor offences pass with impunity,
the old standing customs and usage of the service are
directed to be resorted to in like manner as the
unwritten law is made auxiliary to the statute. 1^7
C. The American General Articles
1. The Articles of War
At the beginning of the American Revolution, the
Continental Congress adopted contemporary British military
law to govern the American forces. The decision to retain
the British customs and discipline, with which most of the
potential officers were familiar from their service in the
French and Indian War, was more than just a matter of
convenience. Instead, it was deliberate emulation and
imitation. John Adams, who drafted the first American
naval articles and the 1776 army code, expressed the reluc-
tance of the Continental Congress to tamper with success:
There was extant one system of articles of war which
had carried two empires to the head of mankind: the
Roman and the British; for the British articles of
war were only a literal translation of the Roman.
It would be in vain for us to seek in our own inven-
tions, or the records of warlike nations, for a more
complete system of military discipline. It was an
observation founded in undoubted facts, that the
1 J. McArthur, supra note 70, at 173. This lan-
guage was also quoted in explanation of the American naval
general articles in A. Harwood, The Law and Practice of
United States Naval Courts-Martial 9 (New York 1S67) .
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prosperity had been in proportion to the discipline
of their forces by sea and land. 108
The first American army code was adopted by the
Second Continental Congress on June 30, 1775. Drafted by
a committee including George Washington, Philip Schuyler,
Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing, and Joseph Hewes , the code
contained 69 articles modeled after the British Articles of
War of 1774. The first American army code contained two
general articles. Article L, which was identical to its
109
counterpart in the 1774 British articles, provided:
All crimes, not capital, and all disorders and
neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty
of, to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline, though not mentioned in the articles
of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general
or regimental court-martial, and be punished at
their discretion.HO
Article XLVII was likewise substantially identical to its
British counterpart and provided: "Whatsoever commis-
sioned officer shall be convicted before a general court-
10 3
3 C. Adams, The Works of John Adams 6 8 (New York
1865), quoted in J. Van Slate, supra note 54, at 58.
109 Rules and Articles for the Better Government of His
Majesty's Horse and Foot Guards, And All Other His Majesty's
Forces in Great Britain and Ireland, Dominions Beyond the
Seas, and Foreign Parts, sec. XX, art. Ill (1774), reprinted
in G. Davis, supra note 15, at 56 [hereinafter cited as
British Articles of War of 1774]
.
Act of June 30, 1775, art. L, reprinted in W.
Winthrop, supra note 49, app. IX, at 957 [hereinafter cited
as the American Articles of War of 1775] .
British Articles of War of 1774, supra note 109, sec.
XV, art. XXIII, at 56, provided "Whatsoever Commissioned
Officer shall be convicted before a General Court Martial
of behaving in a scandalous infamous Manner, such as is
unbecoming the Character of an Officer and a Gentleman shall
be discharged from Our Service."
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martial, of behaving in a scandalous, infamous manner,
such as is unbecoming the character of an officer and a
112gentleman, shall be discharged from the service."
The army general articles remained substantially
unchanged through the enactment of additional articles in
113 . .November 1775, " a complete revision of the army code in
1776, and minor procedural revisions in 1786. The
Articles of War of 1806 revised the unbecoming conduct
article to delete the "scandalous" and "infamous" lan-
guage; but left the prejudicial-conduct article un-
117
changed. The general articles of the 1806 code were
1 12American Articles of War of 1775, supra note 110,
art. XLVII, at 957.
113Act of Nov. 7, 1775, reprinted in W. Wmthrop,
supra note 49, app. IX, at 959-60.
11^
'Act of Sep. 20, 1776, reprinted in id., app. X, at
961-71. The 1776 code was drafted by a committee including
John Adams,- Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson,
and R. R. Livingston, and was intended to make the Ameri-
can articles more closely follow the British. It also
added several procedural and administrative provisions.
Prejudical conduct was prohibited by sec. XVIII, art. 5 ,-
unbecoming conduct was covered by sec. XIV, art. 21.
115Act of May 31, 1786, reprinted in id., app. XI, at
972-975. The 1786 revisions included an unbecoming-conduct
article, art. 20, that was substantially unchanged from the
1775 and 1776 codes.
116Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch . 20, 2 Stat. 359. The
unbecoming conduct article provided: "Any commissioned
officer convicted before a general court-martial of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, shall be dismissed
from the service." Id., art. 83, 2 Stat. 369.
117
Id., art. 99, 2 Stat. 371.
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reenacted substantially unchanged in the next major
revision of the Articles of War in 1874 upon publication of
118
the Revised Statutes. A.W. 62 of the 1874 code provided
All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects,
which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the
prejudice of good order and military discipline,
though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war,
are to be taken cognizance of by a general, or a
regimental garrison, or field-officers* court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
punished at the discretion of such court. U9
A.W. 61 of 1874 provided: "Any officer who is convicted
of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be
dismissed from the service.""
In 1916, the concept of service-discrediting conduct
first appeared in the general articles, when A.W. 62 of
the 1374 code was amended to read:
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the military service, and all crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to military law may
be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general
or special or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense and punished at the
discretion of such court. 121
118Act of June 20, 1874, ch . 333, 18 Stat. 113, R.S.
sec. 1342. Articles from the 1874 and subsequent Army
codes will be denoted, e.g., A.W. 62 of 1874. Code cita-
tions for the 1374 Articles of War will be to the Revised
Statutes
.
119A.W. 62 of 1874, R.S. sec. 1342, art. 62.
120
A.W. 61 of 1874, R.S. sec. 1342, art. 61. The
placement of the unbecoming-conduct article in the 1874
code illustrates how the nature of the unbecoming-conduct
articles changed during the nineteenth century from proce-
dural provisions to punitive articles.
121Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch . 418, art. 96,39 Stat. 666
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This language would become the model for Article 134 of
the Uniform Code.
2. The Articles for the Government of the Navy
American naval law likewise was consciously adopted
from the law and custom of the Royal Navy. The "Rules for
the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies of
122North America" of 1775, largely the work of John Adams,
consisted of 44 articles patterned after the British naval
articles of 1749, which were still in effect. The ancient
custom of the sea was the foundation of American naval law.
In Article 1, for example, commanding officers were
charged to
be very vigilent in inspecting the behavior of all
such as are under them, and to discountenance and
suppress all dissolute, immoral and disorderly prac-
tices; and also, such as are contrary to the rules
of discipline and obedience, and to correct those
who are guilty of the same according to the usage
of the sea.^ 2 ^
124
Article 33, which was similar to its British counterpart,
1 22
Act of Nov. 28, 1775, reprinted in 2 Naval Docu-
ments of the American Revolution 1174-1182 (1966) [herein-
after cited as American Naval Articles of 1775] .
123
Id., art. 1, at 1174.
I'M
British Naval Articles of 1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 33,
art. XXXVI provided: "All other Crimes not Capital, com-
mitted by any Ferson or Persons in the Fleet, which are not
mentioned in this Act, or for which no Punishment is
hereby directed to be inflicted, shall be punished




provided: "All other faults, disorders and misdemeanors
which shall be committed on board any ship belonging to
the thirteen United Colonies, and which are not herein
mentioned, shall be punished according to the laws and
customs in such cases used at sea."
After the Revolution, the U.S. Navy virtually ceased
to exist, and sold its last ship in 1785. However, the
threat from the Barbary corsairs in the early 1790s and
the undeclared naval war with France in the latter part of
that decade prompted the Navy's revival in 1794. In 1799,
Congress enacted "An Act for the government of the Navy of
the United States", which contained a general article
127
almost identical to that of the 1775 naval code.
In 1300, the American naval code was revised under
"An Act for the better government of the Navy of the United
128States". *~ The general article was amended to read: "All
crimes committed by persons belonging to the navy, which
are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall be
129punished according to the laws and customs of the sea."
The substitution of "crimes" for "faults, disorders and
misdemeanors" seems to reflect a Congressional intent to
125American Naval Articles of 1775, supra note 122,
art. 38, at 1177.
126Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch . 24, 1 Stat. 709.
127
Id., art. 46, at 713.
128Act of April 23, 1800, ch . 33, 2 Stat. 45.
129
Id. , art. XXXII, at 49.
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allow prosecution of civilian crimes under the naval
general article, as well as the traditional offenses
against naval discipline. Uhat is more likely, however, is
that the change was merely an effort to require that for a
"fault, disorder" or "misdeameanor'' to be punished under
the naval general article, it must be conduct that,
according to the law and custom of the sea, was recognized
130
as an offense against naval law. The legislative history
is silent on the matter, and no nineteenth century commen-
tator addressed it.
The 1800 naval articles also contained a new provision
concerning scandalous conduct, an offense which was derived
from the unbecoming conduct article in the British naval
131
articles of 1749. The American articles, however, made
scandalous conduct a distinct offense applicable to both
officers and sailors:
An officer, or other person, in the navy, who shall be
guilty of oppression, cruelty, fraud, profane swearing,
or other scandalous conduct, tending to the destruction
of good morals, shall, if an officer, be cashiered, or
suffer such other punishment as a court-martial shall
adjudge; if a private, shall be put in irons, or
1 "5 C\
The 1749 British naval articles similarly
referred to such customary offenses as crimes. See note
124, supra .
131 British Naval Articles of 1749, 22 Geo. 2, c.
33, art. XXXIII provided: "If any Flag Officer, Captain,
or Commander, or Lieutenant belonging to the Fleet, shall
be convicted before a Court Martial of behaving in a
scandalous, infamous, cruel, oppressive, or fraudulent
Manner, unbecoming the Character of an Officer, he shall
be dismissed from His Majesty's Service."
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flogged, at the discretion of the captain, not
exceeding twelve lashes; but if the offense require
severer punishment, he shall be tried by court-
martial, and suffer such punishment as said court
shall inflict. 132
The 1800 naval code remained in effect until 1862,
when it was replaced by the Articles for the Government of
133
the Navy, the code that would govern the Navy for
almost a century until the adoption of the Uniform Code.
The language of the Articles for the Government of the
Navy was substantially similar to that of the British
naval articles of 1749 and to that of the 1800 American
code, but it also reflected growing Congressional concern
132
Act of April 23, 1800, art. Ill, 2 Stat. 45. The
U.S. Navy never had a separate article covering unbecoming
conduct. Instead, unbecoming conduct was prosecuted under
the naval general article. The "scandalous conduct"
offenses under naval law will be relevant to later discus-
sions of unbecoming conduct and service-discrediting
conduct.
133Act of July 17, 1862, ch . 204, 12 Stat. 600, R.S.
sec. 1624. Specific articles of the 1862 code will be
denoted, e.g., A.G.N. 22. To avoid confusion arising out
of the renumbering of the articles in the Revised Statutes,
the numbering of the Revised Statutes, which was used from
1874, will be cited.
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about procedural abuses in the administration of naval
134discipline. A.G.N. 22, the general article, clearly
reflects this: "All offences committed by persons belong-
ing to the navy, which are not specified in the foregoing
articles, shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct;
134 Emblematic of this attitude was the subtle change
to the preambulatory article describing the powers and
duties of the commanding officer. In the 1775 articles,
the commanding officer was charged to enforce discipline
"according to the usage of the sea". A similar invocation
of the custom of the sea appeared in Art. 1 of the 1300
articles. A.G.N. 1, however, concluded with a charge to
commanders to
"guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral
practices, and to correct all who may be guilty of
them according to the laws and regulations of the navy
,
upon pain of such punishment as a general court-martial
may think proper to inflict ." A.G.N. 1, R.S. sec.
1624 , art. 1. (emphasis added)
.
Public interest in curtailing the near-absolute power of a
naval captain at sea had been growing since the 1840s when
both the public and the Navy was scandalized by the summary
execution of Midshipman Philip Spencer— the son of the
Secretary of War—and two enlisted men for attempted mutiny
aboard the USS SOMERS in December 184 2. When the alleged
plot was discovered, the commanding officer, Commander
Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, first promised the three
suspects that they would be taken to New York for a court-
martial. However, Mackenzie changed his mind while the
ship was still at sea and convened a board of inquiry to
determine what to do with the accuseds. The board, made
up primarily of junior officers either related to Mackenzie
or dependent upon him for patronage, without taking any
testimony, recommended hanging, which was executed ten
minutes later. Upon his return to New York, amid a fire-
storm of public controversy, Mackenzie was court-martialed
but acquitted. The summary execution aboard the SOMERS
was the last time the death penalty was executed in the
U.S. Navy.
The change in language in the 1862 Articles, away from
invocation of custom and toward references to laws,
regulations, and court-martial procedures, does not then
necessarily signal a change in naval law. Custom, as will
be demonstrated later, continued to play a vital and
expansive force in naval common law crimes.
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but in no case shall punishment by flogging be inflicted,
nor shall any court-martial adjudge punishment by flog-
,,135gmg.
3. The Enactment of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice
By 136 2 in the Navy and by 1916 in the Army, the
American general articles has assumed the form and scope
that would govern the armed forces until 19 51. The Army's
Articles of War were revised in 1916, 1920, and 1948, but
without significant change to the general articles. In
1940, the Army Articles of War were made applicable to the
new U.S. Air Force. The Coast Guard, which began its
court-martial system in 1906, operated under a code
patterned after naval law and practice.
The legislative history of the Uniform Code with
respect to the general articles is surprisingly sparse but
their enactment was the result of a conscious decision to
retain military common law offenses. Procedural matters,
not substantive lav;, commanded the major attention of both
the drafters of the Uniform Code and Congress. Nonetheless,
the drafters considered several alternatives to the general
A.G.N. 22, R.S. sec. 1624, art. 22. In return for
being free of flogging, the American sailor, under the same
act, lost his daily spirits ration. Scandalous conduct was
prohibited by A.G.N. 3, R.S. sec. 1624, art. 8, and, as in
the 1300 naval articles, was applicable to both officers
and enlisted members.
E. Byrne, supra note 51, at 8-9.
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articles, . but rejected them in favor of incorporating
military common law into the code.
Clearly, the principal concern in drafting the Uniform
Code of Military Justice was the elimination of the wide-
spread procedural abuses witnessed during World War II.
In numerous studies of military justice conducted both
during and after the war, therefore, committee after
committee and report after report consistently pointed to
an epidemic of abuse of command authority in the adminis-
tration of military justice. The "Keefe Report", resulting
from a Navy study of general court-martial sentences,
concluded that almost half the cases studied involved a
"flagrant miscarriage of justice". An Army study, con-
ducted in J. 945-46 by the "Vanderbilt Committee", found
137
"fantastically severe" sentences to be commonplace.
Thus, the major goal of the Uniform Code was to prevent
procedural abuses such as blatent command domination of
the court-martial process, ineffective and inhibited
defense counsel services, and discrimination against
138
enlisted men in charging decisions and sentencing. At
the same time, the authority and responsibility of the
commanding officer for discipline had to be preserved.
In matters of substantive law, the drafters of the
137
W. Generous, Swords and Scales: The Development
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 14-21 (1973)
.
13 8 See White, The Uniform Code of Military Justice
Its Promise and Performance: The Background and the Problem,
35 St. John's L. Rev. 197 (1961).
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Uniform Code, a committee in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense chaired by Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr., of
Harvard Law School, did not consider themselves to be
innovators. Rather, they viewed their task as preserving
the substantive system commonly used by the military
139
services, while updating and clarifying certain offenses.
The only meaningful legislative history of Articles
133 and 134 are the working papers compiled by the Morgan
Committee. The committee considered a number of alterna-
tives to the general articles. One proposal, recommended
by the McGuire Committee's 194 5 study of possible revisions
of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, would have
abolished the general article and virtually eliminated any
mention of specific offenses in the code. Instead the
substantive portion of the code would merely incorporate
by reference five general sources of substantive law: (1)
federal criminal statutes and United States treaties and
conventions; (2) criminal laws of a state, territory, or
possession in which the military member is stationed; (3)
lawful orders or regulations of the service secretary; (4)
custom of the service; and (5) "recognized military
140
offenses" as defined by the service secretary. Another
139 . .Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on
H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Armed Services , 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1238 (1949) (testi-
mony of Felix Larkin) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings! .
140 . . . .Committee on a Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Comparative Studies Notebook sec. 95, at 19 (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1949) .
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proposal, also originating in the Navy Department, would
have listed as many specific offenses as possible, but
would have allowed the President to enumerate and define
141
"military offenses" by Executive Order.
While recognizing that such alternatives to the
142
general articles had merit, the Morgan Committee
perceived serious constitutional objections to the delega-
143tion of legislative authority that they implied. More-
over, the drafters believed that such a system of crimes
defined by executive fiat could detract from the credi-
bility of military justice "because much of the forceful-
ness and solemnity of the Articles, as a disciplinary and
penal code, would be thereby lost."
With only minor modifications in language, A.W. 9 6
of 1916 was adopted by the drafters as Article 134 of the
proposed Uniform Code. A.W. 95 of 1916 became the unbe-
coming conduct provisions of Article 133, with modifica-
tions to include cadets and midshipmen, and to eliminate
the mandatory-dismissal sentence provision of the Army
unbecoming conduct articles. Both of these modifications
were accommodations to Navy practice, which had included
midshipment within the scope of its offense of unbecoming
conduct, and which had not mandated dismissal upon
141 142
Id. at 22. Id. at 23.
1 4 3 144J
Id. at 19, 23. Id. at. 23
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conviction of unbecoming conduct.
Like the drafters, Congress was more concerned about
the procedural safeguards of the proposed Uniform Code.
General questions such as the facial vagueness of the
general articles, their substantive scope, and the myriad
offenses that had been and could be prosecuted under them
were never addressed in hearings nor during floor debate.
Thus, the general articles--which would prompt such intense
and searching controversy only two decades later—and the
ancient system of custom and military common law they
represent quietly passed into modern military law.
145See generally Senate Hearings , supra note 57, at
286 for comments of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
on the wording of Article 133.
146 . .The scope of the general articles was discussed
only with respect to certain specific offenses, such as
carnal knowledge, House Hearings , supra note 139, at 1254,
and whether violations of state criminal laws could be
prosecuted under the general articles. See id. at 1238-1239
(testimony of Felix Larkin) , and 96 Cong. Rec . 1292-1310
(1950) (Senate discussion of whether state law is included
in "crimes and offenses not capital'" clause) . The Senate
Armed Services Committee report on the general articles did
not mention Article 133 at all, and merely parrotted the
language of Article 134, which the Committee explained
would
"permit the punishment of 'disorders and neglects to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces. 1 It will also authorize trial
by court-martial for violation of State and Federal
crimes which are not enumerated as offenses under this
code." S. Rep. No. 436, 31st Cong., 1st Sess
.
, 32 (1949)
The House report's discussion of the general articles was
identical. H. Rep. No. 491, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1949)
It should be noted that the reports were mistaken about the
inclusion of state laws within the scope of the "crimes and
offenses not capital" clause. See Hagan, supra note 23, at
70-71.

III. CUSTOM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
GENERAL ARTICLES LAW
A. Custom as a Source of Military Law
This thesis has already discussed how military law
began and the enforcement of military custom, and how the
purpose of the general articles was to incorporate custom-
ary military offenses into statutory systems of military
law. It was during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that the substantive scope of the general
articles expanded to approximately its modern dimensions
and shape, and that the three classes of military common
law offenses
—
prejudicial conduct, unbecoming conduct,
and service discrediting conduct—emerged as clearly
defined concepts in military law. It is also during this
period that military law demonstrated the two attributes
of a common law system of criminal law discussed previously
the reliance on custom as a source of substantive law, and
the recognition of new common law offenses.
Custom was at the heart of nineteenth century
general articles law, and was recognized as a lex non
scripta that governed the many situations not addressed or




. . . . 147Court decision in Martin v. Mott, Justice Story provided
perhaps the earliest American judicial recognition of
military common law: "a general usage of the military
service, or what may not unfitly be called the customary
148
military law." Justice Story suggested that reliance on
military custom was necessary to the peculiar nature and
needs of military service, which statutes cannot always
foresee; "for there could scarcely be framed a positive
code to provide for the infinite variety of incidents
149
applicable to them."
In 1857 the Supreme Court, rejecting a void-for-
vagueness challenge to the Navy's general article, charac-
terized service usage and the laws and customs of the sea
as substantive sources of naval law. Writing the Court's
. . 150
opinion in Dynes v. Hoover , Justice Wayne described
naval common law as follows
:
And when offences and crimes are not given in terms or
by definition, the want of it may be supplied by a
comprehensive enactment, such as the 32d article of
the rules for the government of the navy, which means
that courts martial have jurisdiction of such crimes
as are not specified, but which have been recognized
147 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). The Court held
that even though there was no statutory authority for the
court-martial by the U.S. Army of a state militia member
who failed to report during a call-up in the War of 1812,
court-martial jurisdiction could properly be based on
customary military law concerning the duties of militiamen
Id . at 35.
149
Id. at 36.
150 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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to be crimes by the usages in the navy of all nations,
and that they shall be punished according to the laws
and customs of the sea. Notwithstanding the apparent
indefiniteness of such a provision, it is not liable
to abuse; for what those crimes are, and how they are
to be punished, is well known by practical men in the
navy and army, and by those who have studied the law
of courts martial, and the offences of which the
different courts martial have cognizance . 151
The nineteenth century treatises also regarded
custom of the service as a source of both procedural and
substantive lav/. Stephen Vincent Benet, in his Civil War
era treatise, called custom "the lex non scripta , a common
152law of the army", being expressly recognized as a source
of law by the oath for court-martial members prescribed by
Article 69 of the 1806 Articles of War. D William W.
151 . .
Id . at 82. The Court also noted that civil courts
lacked jurisdiction to overturn court-martial sentences
that are not contrary to statute or the laws and customs of
the sea.
152 . .
S. Benet, A Treatise on Military Law and the
Practice of Courts-Martial 9 (6th ed., New York, 1866).
153
Id . The 1806 Army code prescribed the following
oath: "You, A.B., do swear that you will well and truly
try and determine, according to evidence, the matter now
before you, between the United States of America and the
prisoner to be tried, and that you will duly administer
justice, according to the provisions of 'An act estab-
lishing Rules and Articles for the government of the
armies of the United States, 1 without partiality, favor,
or affection; and if any doubt should arise, not explained
by said Articles, according to your conscience, the best
of your understanding, and the custom of war in like cases;
and you do further swear that you will not divulge the
sentence of the court until it shall be published by the
proper authority; neither will you disclose or discover
the vote or opinion of any particular member of the court-
martial, unless required to give evidence thereof, as a
witness, by a court of justice, in a due course of law.




Winthrop, probably the foremost nineteenth century author-
ity on American military law—and still the most frequently
cited—compared service custom to the common law:
While the Military Law has derived from the Common Law
certain of the principles and doctrines illustrated in
its code, it has also a lex non scripta or unwritten
common law of its own. This consists of certain
established principles and usages peculiar or pertain-
ing to the military status and service. 154
George 3. Davis, in his 1898 treatise, summarized the
"unwritten military law" as being "a form of customary law
developed from usages of the military service so constantly
repeated and so long adhered to as to confer upon it the
155
character of an authoritative rule of action."
Both Winthrop and Davis described the role of custom
in essentially common law terms. Custom of the service,
said Davis, resembled in its origin and development "those
portions of the Common Law of England which were of similar
derivation." Four conditions must be met for custom of
the service to govern. First, in Winthrop' s words, the
custom "must have prevailed without variation for a long
157period". ^ Davis quoted Blackstone's rule on this point:
"If a particular usage can be shown to have commenced, it
is void as a custom... But if there is no evidence of a
beginning, it will be presumed to have existed during the
154 ;
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 42.
155
G. Davis, supra note 15, at 10.
156 T^ 4- 11Id . at 11.
157




whole period of legal record." Secondly, the custom
must be generally known and invariably observed by those
159
alleged to be subject to its operation. Third, the
custom must establish a compulsory rule, in Davis's words
"the obligatory form of a customary law". Finally, the
custom must not be at variance with existing military law.
Davis felt that a custom of the service could be enforced
so long as it was not contrary to a statute. Winthrop
was more restrictive, requiring that the custom must be
"equitable, and uniform in its application, must not be
prejudicial to military discipline, and must not only not
be at variance with the statute or written law relating to
the army but must pertain to a subject not provided for by
, , ii 1 6 2such law.
Thus, by the close of the nineteenth century, custom
was a long-recognized source of both procedural and sub-
stantive law. The Davis-Winthrop exposition of custom as a
source of law became official black-letter law in Naval
Courts and Boards, the Navy's official procedural guide and
158
3 Blackstone's Commentaries *74-77, quoted in G.
Davis, supra note 15, at 11. As will be seen later,







W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 45.
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substantive law treatise published in 1917. Naval courts-
martial were directed to rely on custom of the service to
resolve both substantive and procedural ambiguities:
Circumstances from time to time arise for the govern-
ment of which there are no written rules to be found.
In such cases, customs of the service govern. Customs
of the service may be likened, in their origin and
development, to the portions of the common lav; of
England similarly established. But custom is not to
be confused with usage; the former has the force of
law; the latter is merely a fact...
The field of operation of the unwritten naval law is
extensive. It is applied in defining certain offenses
against naval law and in determining whether certain
acts or omissions are punishable as such, as in cases
coming under article 22 of the Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy.... At times, also, custom is
appealed to as a rule of interpretation of terms
technical to the naval service. 163
The members of the court-martial were the finders of
this military common law. Whether particular conduct was,
for example, prejudicial to good order and discipline was
a factual issue for the members to decide, drawing on their
experience and knowledge of military values, traditions,
and customs. The question to be answered was "Does this
accused's conduct violate customs of order and discipline?"
Although commentators such as Winthrop and official publi-
cations such as the Army's Manuals for Courts-Martial and
the Navy's Naval Courts and Boards provided general
guidance on what constituted prejudicial conduct or unbe-
coming conduct, each court-martial was left largely to its
own discretion in considering circumstances of each




case. Their findings were rarely disapproved and only
when clearly erroneous.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, a
counter-current in the use of custom began to appear in
general articles law. Factual custom became legal prece-
dent, and certain conduct began to be considered per se
violative of the general articles. Instead of asking "Does
this accused's conduct violate customs of order and disci-
pline?" the question subtly shifted to "Has this conduct
customarily been punished under the general articles?"
without an analysis of the circumstances of the particular
case. As will be seen later in this thesis, the per se
approach to the general articles resulted in considerable
confusion about the meaning of "custom" as the word was
used in the opinions of the appellate military courts in
the early 1950s.
The common law nature of the general articles made
this shift from an analysis of the circumstances of each
case to the invocation of precedent unavoidable. The best
way to explain concepts such as "prejudicial to good order
and discipline" and "conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman" was by examples, such as those extensively
164 See Hagen, supra note 23, at 109-10; W. DeHart,
supra note 17, at 3lY~. Cf_. Nichols, supra note 77, at 124,
who characterizes the decision of whether certain conduct
fell under the general articles as a legal, not factual,
question, i.e. , "Is the conduct per se punishable under the
general article?" not "Is it pre judicTal to good order and
discipline under the circumstances?".
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provided by treatises such as Winthrop's and by the Digest
of Opinions . Later, the Manuals for Courts-Martial and
Naval Courts and Boards would likewise become commonly
accepted as authoritative catalogs of offenses that were
per se violative of the general articles. All a non-
lawyer judge-advocate, commander, or court-martial member
had to do to determine whether the accused could be con-
victed under the general article was to see if the conduct
was listed as an example in a treatise, the Digest of
Opinions
, or a Manual . Custom of the service thus hardened
1 fi sinto legal precedent by 1920.
In the period from 1860 to 1917, however, custom was
nonetheless at the heart of the growth of the substantive
scope of the general articles. The three wars and numerous
skirmishes against the Indians during these years would
provide a multitude of challenges to military discipline
and military law in the form of ingenious culprits and
165This is certainly understandable. It must always
be remembered that military justice in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries--and , to a great extent, even
until 1969--was administered by non-lawyer officers.
Courts-martial were frequently held on the frontier, over-
seas, or on the high seas, far from lawyers and law li-
braries. Most commands had no legal references to consult
other than a treatise—usually Winthrop's—or an official
guide such as the Army's Manuals or Naval Courts and
Boards . The treatises, particularly, were the only source
of legal expertese for most commands. The importance of
these references and the extent of reliance upon them, were
impressed upon the author during his research at the U.S.
Army Library at the Pentagon, where he found a copy of
Winthrop's 1880 Digest of Opinions that had been pain-
stakingly annotated by no fewer than five different persons
from 1880 until approximately 1910.
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novel circumstances. Turning now to the history and
development of prejudicial conduct, unbecoming conduct, and
service discrediting conduct, several interesting points
will be demonstrated. First, each category, described by
its own statutory language, has its origins in military
common law. The statutes merely recognized classes of
offenses that had long been prosecuted under the general
articles. Secondly, each class of offenses was based on
customary norms of discipline, duty, honor, and decorum in
military society. Third, the emergence of each of these
descriptive concepts did not signal a restrictive defini-
tion of the general articles, but rather provided a statu-
tory focal point for the enforcement of custom. Finally,
the principal historical effect of custom was not restric-
tive and limiting, as the Supreme Court supposed in Parker
v. Levy , but instead was to provide elasticity to the
substantive boundaries of the general articles.
B. Prejudicial Conduct
1. Origins in Military Custom
It is uncertain exactly when the concept of prejudi-
cal conduct was first enunciated in the military common
law. One Australian scholar and military lawyer, D. B.
Nichols, fixes its introduction in the first half of the
eighteenth century, certainly no later than 1765, when it
appeared in the British Articles of War of that year.
Nichols, supra note 77, at 115.
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James Snedeker, one of the drafters of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, places its origin a full century ear-
167lier
.
The concept of conduct to the prejudice of good order
and discipline almost certainly predates its appearance in
the military codes. Some evidence suggests Roman origins.
The laws of Arrius Meander, for example, provided: "Every
disorder to the prejudice of general discipline is a
military offense, such as, for instance, the offense of
laziness, or insolence, or idleness." Furthermore, the
very purpose of military law was from its beginning the
preservation of discipline. In a sense, all military
offenses were prejudicial to good order and discipline.
Finally, as has been discussed previously in this thesis,
the principal purpose of the early British military penal
codes was to put the troops on notice of the rudimentary
features of the body of military law to which they would
be subject. Therefore, when the concept of conduct preju-
dicial to good order and discipline began to appear in
military codes in the seventeenth century, it was merely a
convenient reference to the customary offenses, not other-
wise enumerated in the codes, that had long been a part of
military law.
167
J. Snedeker, supra note 16, at 898-99.
J
/" o
°Roman Digest XLIX, sec. 16, at *6, quoted in
Graynor, supra note 48, at 26.
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Interestingly, the prejudicial conduct concept was
introduced to the British military codes by the Swedes.
The "Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the
169Warres" promulgated by King Gustavus Adolphus in 1621
provided in Article 116 that:
Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is
repugnant to Military Discipline, or whereby the
miserable and innocent country may against all right
and reason be burdened withall, whatsoever offence
finally shall be committed against these orders,
that shall the severall Commanders make good, or see
severally punished unlesse themselves will stand
bound to give further satisfaction for it. 1^0
The articles of Gustavus Adolphus were published in
English in 1639 and became the model for British articles
issued that same year and in 1642. A major reason for
the emulation of the Swedish code by the English was that
169 The code of Gustavus Adolphus has been called a
"recognizable ancestor" of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Containing 167 articles, it was perhaps the most
detailed military law code to its time, both in matters of
substantive law and court-martial procedure. In many
respects, Gustavus Adolphus could be called, as one recent
article has suggested, the "father of modern military
justice". See Cooper, Gustavus Adolphus and Military
Justice
, 92~MIl. L. Rev. 129 (1981)
.
170Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the
Warres, art. 116 (1621), reprinted in W. Winthrop, supra
note 49, app. Ill, at 914. James Snedeker likewise con-
siders this provision to be a lineal ancestor of Article
134 of the Uniform Code. J. Snedeker, supra note 16, at
893.
171Cooper, supra note 169, at 134. J. Snedeker,
supra note 16, at 398, see also C. Clode, Administration




a large number of British officers had served with Gustavus
172Adolphus during the Thirty Years War. The "repugnant to
Military Discipline" language of Article 116 of the Swedish
articles was not used in the British general articles in
1731639 or 1642, nor would anything similar to it appear in
. . 174the British army codes until 176 5. Although the reason
for this omission is apparently lost to history, it is
reasonable to assume that with the centuries-old heritage
of military common law that already existed in seventeenth
century England, the drafters of the 1639 and 164 2 codes
viewed "repugnant to Military Discipline" as surplussage
denoting a concept implicit in "faults, disorders, and
offenses" language already common to British general arti-
cles
.
172 Cooper, supra note 169, at 133. For example, in
1632, 32 colonels, 52 lieutenant colonels, and 14 majors,
mostly Scots, served under Gustavus Adolphus.
173The 1639 general article is quoted, supra , in Part
II-B-2. The articles issued in 1642 by the Earl of Essex,
commander-in-chief of the Parliamentary forces, provided:
"All other faults, disorders and offences, not mentioned in
these articles shall be punished according to the general
customes and laws of warre." Nichols, supra note 77 at
113.
174 Sec. XX, art. Ill, of the British Articles of War
of 1765 is quoted, supra , in Part II-B-3, and prohibited
"Crimes not Capital" and "Disorders or Neglects ... to the
Prejudice of good Order and Military Discipline".
Although the British articles were modeled after
those of Gustavus Adolphus, language more traditional to
British military codes was used. The Articles of War of
1625, for example, referred to customary military offenses
as "disorders", while the 1627 general article for the
army used the phrase "abuses and offences". Nichols, supra
note 77, at 113.
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A clearer indication of the origins of the prejudi-
cial conduct concept in military common law is to be found
in naval law. British naval articles prior to the American
Revolution and American naval codes thereafter never spe-
cifically mentioned prejudicial conduct, but instead
employed a variety of traditional denominations of the
customary naval offenses: "faults, misdemeanors, and
1 *7 fc\ 111
disorders";" "All other Crimes not Capital"; "faults,
17 8 17 9disorders and misdemeanors"; and "offenses".
There are two theories explaining this apparent
omission. The first explanation views the omission of
prejudicial conduct language from the naval articles as an
intentional recognition of the peculiar needs of the naval
service. D. B. Nichols hypothesizes that:
[I] t seems possible to draw the conclusion that the
concept was introduced to reconcile the exigencies of
overseas service with the tenets of the common lawyers.
Although the scope for the trial of crimes by court
1 "7 *"
°British Naval Articles of 1661, 13 Car. 2, c. 89,
art. XXXIII, quoted, supra , in Part II-B-2.
177British Naval Articles of 1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 33,
art. XXXVI, quoted supra note 124.
173American Naval Articles of 1775, supra note 122,
art. 33, at 1177, quoted, supra , in Part II-C-2.
9 A.G.N. 22, R.S. sec. 1624, art. 22, quoted, supra ,
in Part II-C-2. By 1866 the Royal Navy had adopted preju-
dicial conduct language in its general article. "Every
person subject to this Act who shall be guilty of any act,
disorder, or neglect to the prejudice of good order and
naval discipline, not herein-before specified, shall be
dismissed from Her Majesty's service, with disgrace, or
suffer such other punishment as is herein-after mentioned."




martials in England in time of peace was narrow and
contrary to the successful beliefs of the 17th century,
wider provision was necessary for overseas service.
Military law could be justified on the ground of
necessity. The legitimacy of the general article
would be strengthened by limiting it to those offenses
which imparled the efficiency of the army. There had
never been the same objection to a standing navy and
the obvious requirements of discipline on board ship
justified an unqualified general article. 180
The second and more likely explanation is that the
practice of punishing behavior prejudicial to good order
and discipline was already indelibly engrained in customary
naval law, having been implicit in the commanding officer's
authority and responsibility under the law of the sea to
enforce and preserve discipline. The American naval arti-
cles particularly stressed the commander's ancient powers
and charged commanding officers to '"suppress all dissolute,
immoral, and disorderly practices, and also such as are
181
contrary to the rules of discipline and obedience...".
Moreover, even without express statutory mention of preju-
dicial conduct, the Navy prosecuted conduct prejudicial to
good order and discipline, denominated as such, under its
18 2
single general article. Thus, the addition of "to the
180 Nichols, supra note 77, at 115.
181 American Naval Articles of 1775, supra note 122,
art. 1, at 1174.
182
"Conduct to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline" was one of 32 general classes of general articles
offenses listed in Naval Courts and Boards. "Conduct unbe-
coming an officer and a gentleman" was another example.
Naval Courts and Boards, 1917, sec. 390, at 217-18.
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prejudice, of good order and military discipline" to the
Navy's general article would have neither added to nor
restricted naval law; and its absence posed no impediments
nor gave rise to any substantive distinctions from the
military common law of the Army.
2. The Scope of Prejudicial Conduct
The scope of prejudicial conduct expanded to its
modern dimensions between 1860 and 1907. Although the
Army general articles, A.W. 99 of 1806 and A.W. 62 of 1874,
differed somewhat from the Navy's A.G.N. 22 of 1862, the
two services generally prosecuted the same offenses as
prejudicial conduct. Of course, there were a very few
notable exceptions. The Navy, for example, considered
concealing venereal disease as conduct prejudicial to good
18 3
order and discipline, while the Army, at least in the
184
case of enlisted men, specifically held to the contrary.
On the other hand, the Army long recognized negligent
homicide as prejudicial conduct, while the Navy apparently
18 3Naval Court and Boards, 1937, sec. 457, at 237.
184Opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army
No. 72-210 (1913), Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army 1912-1932, sec. 1488 (1932) [hereinafter




never did. On the whole, however, prejudicial conduct
under the general articles was a single body of substantive
criminal law administered by two separate jurisdictions.
Both the Army and the Navy court-martial systems shared a
common core value of the primacy of discipline, and each
drew on its own values, customs, and traditions to apply
the concept of prejudice to discipline to the cases it
tried under the general articles
.
It is impossible to say with any reasonable historical
certainty how many distinct types of misconduct were recog-
nized as prejudicial to good order and discipline. The
field seems to stretch beyond the visible horizon. It
includes offenses which a modern military lawyer would
readily recognize as prejudicial to good order and disci-
See United States v. Kirchner, 1 CM. A. 477, 4
C.M.R. 69, 70 (1952); see generally Zoghby, Is There a
Military Common Law of Crimes ? 27 Mil. L. Rev. 75, 90-91
(1965) . Although the Navy did not, prior to the Uniform
Code, prosecute negligent homicide denominated as such,
careless handling and discharge of weapons resulting in
death was recognized as prejudicial conduct under A.G.N.
22. United States v. Reed, C.M.O. 33 at 3-12 (Navy 1914)
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, , 186 . .. cc . 187pline, such as drunkenness , impersonating an officer,
18 8
and disloyal statements. Others are now merely histori-
cal curiosities, such as "inefficiency in service against
189Indians", illegally introducing liquor into the Indian
I O "I Q I
country, J and "arbitrary treatment of camp followers".
In some cases the courts-martial found prejudice to good
order and discipline in somewhat humorous circumstances.
Consider, for example, the 1897 case of a Marine private
who, while paraded at formation to hear his sentence in a
previous court-martial announced, behaved in "a frivolous
See W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 722-23, for a
discussion of how drunkenness "has always been a more
heinous offence in the military than in the civil code."
18 7
Id . at 731. Winthrop footnoted each example with
numerous case citations. Nineteenth-century Army citation
convention, however, identified cases only by the number
of the order approving the findings and sentence, the
headquarters issuing the order, and the year. Since Army
court-martial orders were not published in any system of
reporters, they are no longer readily retrievable by
modern researcher. Their citation in this thesis would be
of no practical vale. Moreover, Colonel Winthrop 's
treatise is still accorded such authority by modern courts
that reference to it is, as a practical matter, sufficient
to support a proposition. Navy cases during this period,
however, will be cited in the format shown, supra , at note
185, because there is no secondary source of American
naval law comparable to Winthrop. Naval court-martial
orders from this period are filed chronologically at the












and improper manner" by playing with a stray dog that
192
wandered onto the parade deck.
Colonel Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents is
still considered to have the most complete list of the
various types of misconduct that had been found by Army
courts-martial to constitute conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline. Winthrop catalogued 123 distinct
"neglects and disorders" as well as a number of civilian
noncapital crimes that could also be prosecuted under the
general article if they were, under the circumstances,
. . . . . 193prejudicial to good order and discipline. Even with
Colonel Winthrop's extensive, painstakingly cited list, one
cannot help but feel that he attempted to measure an ice-
berg; for Winthrop intended his examples of prejudicial
. . 194
conduct to be only illustrative, not definitive. The
vast substantive territory encompassed by prejudicial con-
duct offenses was suggested by Winthrop's comments on the
phrase "disorders and neglects":
In this comprehensive term are included all such
insubordination; disrespectful or insulting language
or behaviour towards superiors or inferiors in rank;
violence; immorality; dishonesty; fraud or falsifica-
tion; drunken, turbulent, wanton, mutinous, or irreg-
ular conduct; violation of standing orders, regula-
tions, or instructions; neglect or evasion of official
or routine duty, or failure to fully or properly
perform it; in fine all such "sins of commission
192United States v. Daley, G.C.M.O. 109 (Navy 1897)





or omission," on the part either of officers or
soldiers as, on the one hand, do not fall within
the category of the "crimes" previously designated,
and, on the other hand, are not expressly made
punishable in any of the other ("foregoing")
specific Articles of the code, while yet being
clearly prejudicial to good order and military
discipline . l9b~
Nothwithstanding the great variety of prejudicial
conduct offenses that emerged between 1360 and 1970, they
can be classified into several broad categories, all of
which were clearly identifiable by 1900. While in certain
cases the categories may appear to overlap, each class
describes a value traditionally viewed as vital to the
preservation of discipline.
1. Derelictions of duty . Prior to the enactment of
Article 9 2 of the Uniform Code, the unsatisfactory perfor-
mance or nonperformance of a duty imposed by superior
authority or by custom of the service was punishable as
prejudicial conduct. Many examples involved somewhat
mundane shortcomings, such as allowing prisoners to
196 . . 197
escape, and inattention to lessons at the post school.
Dereliction of duty also involved the culpably unsatisfac-
tory performance of important military responsibilities,
for which officers seemed particularly subject to prose-
cution. Examples of such serious derelictions included
195








19 3devolving important work upon an incompetent subordinate,
199failure to maintain discipline, failure to quell a
200
riot, failure to supervise and inspect public work
under one's charge, causing troops to be transported on
a steamer known to be unsafe, medical malpractice,
and failure by the senior officer present to assume command
204
when it devolved to him. 3y contrast, mere errors in




Id . See also Confederate States v. Cannet, CO.
94 (Dept. of S. Car. & Ga
.
, C.S.A., 1362) ( failure to halt
fleeing sentinels and make them stand their posts)
,
reported in Military Laws of the Confederate States 134-35
(Richmond, 1863). The Confederacy adopted the U.S. Army's
Articles of War of 1306 with the exception of substituting
"Confederate States" for "United States" and substituting
other provisions concerning precedence among officers and
devolution of command. "An Act for the establishment and
organization of the Army of the Confederate States of
America", March 6, 1861, sec. 29, reprinted in Military
Laws of the Confederate States 7, 12-13.
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 726.
Id .
Id. at 728, Army Dig. Op., 1901, sec. 159, at 54.
203
Id. ; W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 728; United
States v. Willson, G.C.M.O. 6 (Navy 1833) (willful refusal
to treat patients during a yellow fever epidemic)
.




not held prejudicial to good order and discipline.
2 . Offenses against military administration .
Examples of this group of prejudicial conduct offenses
would include the following: graft or impropriety in
20 6procurement of military supplies; falsification of
United States v. Driscoll, C.M.O. 7-1917 (Navy
1917) . But see the British court-martial of Lt. Gen. John
Whitelock, who was convicted and cashiered in 1808 for
prejudicial conduct arising out of his blunders during the
siege of Buenos Aires in July 1807. In short, General
Whitelock' s offense was to snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory, a victory won despite his leadership. The four
specifications of which he was convicted alleged: (1)
making "offensive and unusual" surrender demands that only
encouraged the Spanish garrison at Buenos Aires to continue
their resistance, thus increasing "the difficulties of the
service"; (2) failing to "make the military arrangements,
best calculated to ensure the success of his operations",
thus unnecessarily exposing British troops to danger; (3)
failing to support several divisions under his command
which, without support or instructions, were compelled to
surrender; and (4) having captured Buenos Aires, only to
return it to the Spanish as part of surrender terms he
imposed on the defeated Spanish! The misadventures of
General Whitelock and his resulting court-martial are re-
ported in C. James, A Collection of the Charges, Opinions
and Sentences of General Courts Martial 262-64 (London 1820)
2 o c
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 729, cites examples
such as: accepting false receipts for government funds not
paid; conflicts of interests in military procurement; and
accepting bribes; United States v. Little, C.M.O. 41-1915
(Navy 1915) (unauthorized and illegal agreement with ship-
building company resulting in government having no recourse
in the event of defective workmanship; acquittal disap-
proved by Secretary of the Navy as not in accordance with
the evidence). Cf. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886)
(Navy's Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing con-
victed of scandalous conduct, rather than merely prejudi-
cial conduct, for making illegal contracts and payments






reports, documents, or official statements; failure to
20 3
observe the chain of command; obstruction or abuse of
military justice; and misconduct during a court-
20 7Falsifications by enlisted men were customarily
prosecuted as prejudicial conduct; those by officers were
prosecuted as unbecoming conduct. W. Winthrop, supra note
49, at 732. The Navy followed a similar practice. See
United States v. Gallagher, G.C.M.O. 24 (Navy 1395) (pro-
curing ferry passage with forged pass as prejudicial con-
duct) ; United States v. Higgens, G.C.M.O. 23 (Navy 1894)
(falsifying parental consent to enlist). Cf. United States
v. Seely, G.O. 148 (Navy 1869) (deliberate misrepresentation
to commanding officer as unbecoming conduct) . Some falsi-
fications by officers were also prosecuted in the Navy as
scandalous conduct, especially when made to cover up other
wrongdoing. See e.g. United States v. Kershner, G.C.M.O.
30 (Navy 1896) (false testimony by officer to court of
inquiry) ; United States v. Houston, G.C.M.O. 56 (Navy 1888)
(false statement concerning cheating on an examination).
United States v. Ormsby, G.C.M.O. 37 (Navy 1836)
.
209
IV. Winthrop, supra note 4 9, at 726, 723, 730,
citing examples such as: failure to bring offending infe-
riors to punishment; failure to report misconduct by sol-
diers under noncommissioned officer's supervision; and
ordering a garrison court to try a capital case and then
arresting the court-martial members when they properly
ruled that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
such an offense. See also United States v. Webster,
G.C.M.O. 3 (Navy 1382) ( failure to forward incriminating







3. Insubordination and disloyalty . Examples of
offenses in this category all involve violations of customs
of deference to military authority, including disrespectful
211 212
or insubordinate statements or conduct; willful
210
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 728, 730, citing
examples such as: improperly disclosing proceedings in
secret session; refusal by member to vote for a sentence
after a conviction; drunken or disrespectful behavior at
trial; false testimony; "transcending the privilege of the
defence or 'statement' by indulging in unwarrantable stric-
tures upon a superior officer, or gross personalities";
suborning or attempting to suborn perjury; attempting to
intimidate witnesses; failure to appear before a court-
martial, either as a witness or the accused; and appearing
drunk before a court-martial. Such misconduct was also
punished, in the case of officers, as unbecoming conduct,
id . at 714, or, in especially aggravated cases in the Navy,
as scandalous conduct. United States v. Mahoney, G.C.M.O.
104 (Navy 1896) (officer incapacited by drunkenness to serve
as judge-advocate at a Marine Corps general court-martial;
"a far graver offense" than mere drunkenness)
.
211
In the Army, A.W. 20 of 1874, R.S. sec. 1342, art.
20, prohibited only disrespect towards one's commanding
officer; disrespectful statements or conduct toward other
superiors was prosecuted as prejudicial conduct. W. Win-
throp, supra note 49, at 728. See also , e.g., United States
v. Thompson, G.C.M.O. 81 (Navy 1894) (stating "Well, I'll go
anyway" to executive officer when leave request denied)
;
United States v. Durand, G.C.M.O. 5 (Navy 1832) (disrespect-
fully persisting in demand to see superior officer on quar-
terdeck rather than privately in the superior's cabin as
the latter had requested); United States v. Wheeler, G.O.
182 (Navy 1873) (officer declaring in presence of other
officers that he would not perform duties involving manual
labor or physical exertion because they were "unbecoming
an officer of his rank")
.
212 . .
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 728, 731, citing
examples such as: participating in meetings convened for
purpose of expressing disapproval of the orders or acts of
superiors; joining with others in requesting the resignation
of a superior officer; "combining and holding meetings in a
spirit of insubordination against superior authority"; and





disobedience of orders not cognizable under a specific
213
article of the codes; and making or publishing criti-
- 214 . r . 215 ,. , ,216 . . . _.cal, defamatory, or disloyal statements. Also
213
In the Army, A.W. 21 of 1874, R.S. sec. 1342, art.
20, prohibited disobedience only of the orders of a superior
officer. Willful disobedience of others authorized to issue
lawful orders to the accused, such as a noncommissioned
officer, petty officer, or person in the execution of law
enforcement duties, was punished under the general articles.
See also , e.g., United States v. Wiles, G.C.M.O. 3 5 (Navy
1897) (willful disobedience of Naval cadet) ; United States
v. Pettit, G.C.M.O. 65 (Navy 1896) (willful disobedience of
chief petty officer) ; United States v. Flynn, G.C.M.O. 11
(Navy 1895) (willful disobedience of noncommissioned offi-
cer) ; United States v. Fleming, G.C.M.O. 22 (Navy 1894)
(sailor in custody of Marine patrol disobeying order to
stop singing); United States v. Bostick, G.C.M.O. 95 (Navy
1893) (officer refusing to give countersign to sentry)
.
214
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 727, 731; United
States v. O'Neill, G.C.M.O. 37 (Navy 1896) (complaining of
commanding officer's "unfairness" to newspaper reporter).
215
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 732 (preferring
false charges); United States v. Decker, C.M.O. 5-1917
(Navy 1917) (defamation of superior officer concerning
disputed debt superior allegedly owed accused) . Defamation
by officers would often also be prosecuted as unbecoming
conduct. W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 714.
216
Id. at 728; Navy C.M.O. 37-1917 at 4 (1917)
(multiple case court-martial order; accused's name not
recited). See also Army Dig. Op., 1912-1930, sec. 1462,
at 725, citing cases holding disloyal statements under
military law to be a distinct offense from those prohibited
by Espionage Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 217.

74
arguably included as a disrespectful prejudicial conduct
offense would be an assault on a superior in the execution
217




4. Status offenses . This category includes viola-




In the army, A.W. 21 of 1374 prohibited assault
against one's superior officer in the execution of his
office. Assaults against noncommissioned officers were
prosecuted under the general article. W. Winthrop, supra
note 49, at 732. The Navy, which prohibited assaults
against superior officers, in the execution of office,
under A.G.N. 4, R.S. sec. 16 24, art. 4(3), followed a sim-
ilar practice. See , e.g., United States v. Hooper, G.C.M.O.
4 (Navy 1831) (assault on sergeant of the guard by Marine
prisoner) ; United States v. Douglas, G.C.M.O. 49 (Navy 1S80)
(assaulting members of ship's police); United States v.
Bracken, G.O. 145 (Navy 1869) (assault with an earthen bowl
upon a noncommissioned officer)
.
218
This category would also include actions by offi-
cers that devalue their superiority in rank over subordi-
nates, such as fraternization. Such conduct was usually
prosecuted as unbecoming conduct, but occasionally would
be charged merely as prejudicial conduct when the circum-
stances were not particularly aggravated or dishonorable.
See , e.g., United States v. Berrien, G.C.M.O. 16-1917 (Navy
1917) (inviting enlisted man on duty to saloon for a drink;
"It is contrary to the spirit of the day and of the service
for any officer to set the example of drinking and treating
with men who look to officers for leadership and guidance.")
United States v. Liggett, C.M.O. 19-1914 (Navy 1914) (offi-
cer drinking with enlisted men in officers' messroom)
.
19
E.g., United States v. Moss, C.M.O. 40-1915 (Navy
1915) (AWOL after leave expired thereby willfully missing
ship's movement); United States v. Hopkins, G.C.M.O. 50






escapes, fraudulent enlistment, and attempted
222desertion.
5. Liquor-related offenses . The propensity of
soldiers and sailors to drink, and the serious harm to
discipline that can result, gave rise to a constellation
of liquor-related offenses, such as: drunkenness on post
223 . 224
or aboard ship, or on liberty; bringing or smuggling
O O R O O C
liquor on post or aboard ship; ' allowing a subordinate
227 .
to go on duty when known to be intoxicated; incapacitation
220
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 729; United States
v. Clark, G.C.M.O. 93 (Navy 1396) (violation of arrest by
removing leg irons); United States v. Bryant, G.C.M.O. 73
(Navy 1895) (attempted escape) ; United States v. Carr,
G.C.M.O. 68 (Navy 1895) (escape and attempted AWOL)
.
221
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 733-35; United
States v. Jacobson, G.C.M.O. 102 (Navy 1893)
.
222
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 729.
223Winthrop stated, "There can indeed rarely be an
occasion when a soldier, or an officer, in camp or at a
military post, may become intoxicated, and thus incapaci-
tated for properly answering a call for duty, without
rendering himself liable to be treated as an offender
within the terms of Art. 62." Id. at 723.
224
Id . at 723: "Whether the act, when committed under
other circumstances, as where the party is at a station
which is not a military post, or is travelling, or is on a
pass, &c, may properly be charged as a military offence,
will depend upon the relation and effect, if any, which
such act may have, under the circumstances, to the military
service and upon military discipline."
Id. at 729; e.g., United States v. Parsons, G.C.M.O
86 (Navy 1894) (smuggling liquor into Navy yard)
.
°Naval Courts and Boards, 1917, sec. 390, at 217;
e.g., United States v. Long, G.C.M.O. 53 (Navy 1888).
227




for duty due to prior intoxication; and violating formal
229pledge to abstain from liquor.
6. Disorderly conduct . Prejudicial conduct also
included a class of misconduct that could be broadly
described as disorderly conduct. The core value of these
offenses was the preservation of the ordered routine upon
which military discipline depends. Also present, particu-
larly in cases arising off-post or ashore, is a suggestion
of a need to prevent service-discrediting behavior, which
undermines public respect for the military and thereby
complicates the performance of the military mission in an
area. Examples of disorders in this class would include
228United States v. Lange, C.M.O. 2-1917 (Navy 1917)
(incapacitation requiring hospitalization) . The Navy seemed
to prosecute incapacitation for duty more often as scan-
dalous conduct, particularly in the cases of officers and
petty officers. See , e.g., United States v. Schonborg,
C.M.O. 16-1914 (Navy 1914) (chief boatswain's mate); United
States v. Adams, G. C.M.O. 50 (Navy 1898) (officer "suffer-
ing from the effects of a debauch") ; United States v. Smith,
G. C.M.O. 39 (Navy 1895) (disbursing officer)
.
229
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 732. Officers
violating such pledges were more frequently prosecuted for
unbecoming conduct. Id. at 718; e.g., United States v.
Frary, G. C.M.O. 31 (Navy 1882) . The Navy would also
occasionally prosecute violations of temperance pledges as
scandalous conduct. E.g., United States v. Hobson, G. C.M.O.




such diverse offenses as: wifebeating, especially when in
the presence of other soldiers; officers gambling with
231 .
enlisted men; insulting, provoking, or obscene lan-
232 233guage; disrupting a Salvation Army meeting; care-
234lessly setting fire to a forest in a national part;
T t c j "3 r
possession of contraband "' or stolen goods; and
fighting with another officer in the presence of enlisted
237
men.
7 . Civilian noncapital crimes . In the nineteenth
century noncapital felonies and misdemeanors under civilian
criminal law were prosecuted as prejudicial conduct. In
theory, such crimes were punishable only when, under the
circumstances, they prejudiced good order and discipline.
230
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 731.
231
Id . at 727, 730. Gambling on the post was also
prosecuted as prejudicial conduct.
232United States v. Scott, G.C.M.O. 107 (Navy 1897)
(obscene and threatening language to hospital patients)
;
United States v. Mull, G.C.M.O. 130 (Navy 1896) (to a
sentry); United States v. Heriot, G.C.M.O. 41 (1895) (to a
chaplain) .
233
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 731.
234
Id. at 732.
35Navy C.M.O. 53-1917 at 4 (1917) (civilian clothing)
;
Navy C.M.O. 15-1918 at 4 (1918) (narcotics) .
Navy C.M.O. 72-1917 at 6 (1917) (pawning stolen
goods) .
United States v. Meade, G.C.M.O. 29 (Navy 1882) .
Such conduct was also commonly prosecuted as unbecoming
conduct. W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 714.
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Such a limitation appears to have been only unevenly
observed, particularly on the frontier and overseas. By
1907 whatever requirement of prejudice ever existed in
cases involving civilian crimes was abandoned, and civilian
noncapital crimes emerged as an independent basis for
criminal liability under the general articles. This
development will be discussed in greater detail later.
3. Custom and Deference in the Expansion
of Prejudicial Conduct
Three characteristics of nineteenth century prejudi-
cial conduct law are particularly noteworthy; because they
not only explain the expansion of the substantive scope of
prejudicial conduct, but also provide insight into the
nature, purpose, and function of the general articles
today
.
First of all, prejudicial conduct law was firmly
rooted--perhaps more than any other substantive area of
military law--in the need to preserve and enforce disci-
pline. Not surprisingly, a bias in favor of discipline
seemed to shape the determination of whether the accused's
conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline.
Military discipline has traditionally been viewed as
a fragile entity, nonetheless absolutely essential for the
successful completion of the military mission. Especially
on the frontier, overseas, and at sea, every court-martial
was something of a cause celebre. In a close case,
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acquittal of a charge of prejudicial conduct could, it was
commonly felt, impair discipline by creating the appearance
that the accused had beaten the system. Therefore, in many
cases, the benefit of the doubt on the issue of prejudice
went to the command, not to the accused.
By the end of the nineteenth centry, the major Amer-
ican commentators agreed that any prejudice to order or
discipline must be direct, not remote or merely a possi-
bility. Winthrop' s statement of the rule, which has
survived to be included in the present edition of the
2 38Manual , is certainly the most familiar to military
lawyers
:
An irregular or improper act on the part of an officer
or soldier can scarcely be conceived which may not be
regarded as in some indirect or remote sense or manner
prejudicing military discipline; but it is hardly to
be supposed that the Article contemplated such distant
effects, and the same is therefore deemed properly to
be confined to cases in which the prejudice is reason-
ably direct and palpable . 2 39
However, as Winthrop also noted, "a strict rule on
240
this subject, however, has not been observed in practice."
Especially with respect to off-base civilian crimes, courts-
martial tended to conclude that the accused's conduct was
prejudicial even when his conduct prejudiced discipline in,
at best, an arguably hypothetical way. Although the records
See M. CM., 1969 (Rev.), para. 213b, at 28-72.
239 . .






of most of these old courts-martial are, at best, incomplete,
and, at worst, have been lost, the surviving records often
raise legitimate doubts about whether there really was a
reasonable and palpable risk to discipline in a given case.
Consider, as just one of scores of potential examples,
the nineteenth century convictions, cited in Winthrop, for
abusing one's wife in the presence of other soldiers.
How could such behavior have posed a direct and palpable
threat to good order and discipline within the unit, espe-
cially if the accused was an enlisted man? Would the
witnesses have been likely to emulate such conduct? Con-
sider also the 1893 conviction of a soldier who disrupted
an off-base Salvation Army meeting and assaulted those who
242
ejected him from the hall. While such conduct certainly
prejudiced the good order of the Salvation Army, prejudice
to military discipline seems remote. Likewise the offense
243
of selling liquor to the Indians, which could easily
have hurt good order and discipline among the various
Indian customers, seems to have, at best, an attenuated
244impact on military discipline.
241




, citing an 1893 case.
243 . .
Id. , citing an 1889 case.
244
If anything, such examples suggest service dis-
crediting conduct, and, as will be discussed, infra , in
Part III-C, are evidence that such conduct was punished
under the general articles long before it appeared in the
Articles of War of 191G.
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The explanation of such apparent aberrations is that
prejudicial conduct was jury-made law. The members of the
court-martial, acting in a capacity analogous to a civilian
jury, would decide whether an accused's conduct was prejudi-
cial largely through an ad hoc application of general
. . 245
notions of discipline to specific cases. As previously
246
noted, the treatises were the principal source of
guidance on the question of what constitutes prejudicial
conduct; but they usually dealt only in broad generali-
247 . .ties. Specific examples, such as those recited by
Winthrop or listed in the Digest of Opinions , were helpful
and relied upon in similar cases; but, they were of little
use in novel cases and, for the most part, applicable only,
at best, by analogy to the Navy, which had its own distinct
customs, values, and disciplinary needs. Thus, in a novel
case, the court-martial members had to rely on their own
knowledge of military customs to assess the extent of
prejudice to good order and discipline. When a novel
prejudicial conduct offense was found by a court-martial,
it was the product of a reliance on military custom as the
members perceived it, rather than case precedents listed in
245Graynor, supra note 48, at 265.
Supra , note 165.
247 See Justice Stewart's criticism of Winthrop's
explanation of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a





248Winthrop or the generalized musings of the commentators.
Discipline was thus enforced by those presumably most
familiar with it by their own experience and most directly
involved with and dependent upon it, the officers selected
to sit on the court-martial.
This leads to the second important characteristic of
the development of prejudicial conduct law: the central
role of the court-martial members. Not only did the mem-
bers, by convicting an accused of prejudicial conduct,
implicitly find as a factual matter that the conduct, under
the circumstances, was prejudicial to good order and disci-
249 ...pline; but their findings were given great deference by
both military reviewing authorities and civilian courts.
It is not surprising, therefore, that convictions
for prejudicial conduct were very rarely disapproved on
grounds of accused's conduct not having been directly and
250palpably prejudicial to good order and discipline.
248
Indeed, every such case cited by Winthrop was, at
one time, a novel offense. Moreover, Winthrop seems to
have made a special effort to cite some of the more ususual
factual patterns in order to demonstrate the broad scope
and variety of prejudicial conduct.
249 See Hagan, supra note 23, at 100. But see Nichols,
supra note 77, at 124, who characterizes the court-martial 's
determination as one of law. The great deference accorded
a finding of guilty, however, suggests that it was treated
as a finding of fact.
250
In the Navy, from 1863 through 1897, not a single
conviction for prejudicial conduct under A.G.N. 22 was




There were, of course, procedural reasons for this reluc-
tance to overturn the court-martial ' s finding. Although a
reviewing authority could lawfully disapprove a finding of
guilty with unfettered discretion and without stated
251
reason, deference to the court-martial ' s findings was
preferred. Thus, Winthrop advised that "it will in general
be wise" for the reviewing authority to approve convictions
252
unless clearly unsupported by any evidence.
Beneath this procedural reluctance to overturn sup-
portable findings of fact, however, was a more basic
philosophical deference to the court-martial members as
experts in matters of military custom and discipline.
Prejudicial conduct cases inherently involved an assessment
of probable impact on discipline. Reviewing authorities in
the service deferred to the court-martial members as the
ones most intimately involved with disciplinary consider-
ations at the local command, where the conduct occurred
and where its adverse impact would usually occur. Civilian
courts were likewise loathe to scrutinize the findings of
a properly convened court-martial not only out of consider-
253
ation for the separation of powers, but also because of
251
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 691.
252
Id. at 691-92.
253Courts-martial are commonly known as "Article I
courts", arising out of the power of Congress "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces 1'.
U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 3, cl. 14. Also, military justice
has traditionally been viewed as the exercise of the Pres-
ident's powers as Commander in Chief under Id., art. II,




unfamiliarity with the ways of the separate society. Thus,
in Smith v. Whitney , Justice Gray demurred: "Of questions
not depending upon the construction of the statutes, but
upon unwritten military law or usage, within the jurisdic-
tion of courts -martial , military or naval officers, for
their training and experience in the service, are more
254
competent judges than courts of common law.
By 1900 the philosophy of deference had hardened into
a procedural rule promulgated by the Judge Advocate General
of the Army. Concerning whether civilian crimes against
civilian victims can be conduct prejudicial to good order
and discipline, "the judgment on the subject of a court of
military officers, experts as to such cases, confirmed by
the proper reviewing commander, should be reluctantly
255disturbed. "
In civilian courts, deference crystallized into a
rule of virtual non-reviewability of military administrative
256
and disciplinary decisions. In Swaim v. United States
the former Judge Advocate General of the Army brought an
action in the Court of Claims to recover back pay and
restoration to duty following his conviction in 1885 under
the general article. in rejecting Swaim 1 s claim, the Court
of Claims stated:
254 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. at 178.
255Army Dig. Ops., 1901, sec. 1, at 53.
256 28 Ct.Cl. 173 (1893), aff'd 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
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The cases which involve conduct to the prejudice of
good order and military discipline are still further
beyond the bounds of ordinary judicial judgment, for
they are not measurable by our innate sense of right
and wrong, of honor and dishonor, but must be gauged
by an actual knowledge of experience of military law,
its usages and duties. All that a civil court can do
in these collateral cases is to look into the record
and see that the wide discretion which the articles
of war give to a court-martial and the commanding
officer who approves the sentence has not been abused;
that the sentence does not rest on suppositions or
frivolous pretexts; that the case presents facts which
a body of experienced, intelligent, impartial, military
experts may reasonably hold, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, to be prejudicial to good order and
military discipline. When such facts appear, the
civil court must concede that they constitute the
offense embodied in the charge. 257
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Shiras flatly
rejected Swaim's contention that his conduct had not been
prejudicial to good order and discipline as being non-
reviewable: "...this is the very matter that falls within
the province of courts-martial, and in respect to which
their conclusions cannot be controlled or reviewed by the
. i ,, 2. 5 8civil courts
.
The third notable characteristic of prejudicial
conduct law during its formative years was the expansive
pressure within the court-martial system to extend the
257
Id. , 28 Ct.Cl. at 227.
2 5 8
Id. , 165 U.S. at 562. See also Reaves v.
Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911) : "To those in the
military or naval service of the United States, the military
law is due process. The decision, therefore, of a military
tribunal acting within the scope of its lawful powers cannot
be reviewed or set aside by the courts." The non-
reviewability doctrine was not overturned until Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
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scope of general articles prosecutions beyond that which
could reasonably be argued to be prejudicial to good order
and discipline. The source of this expansive pressure was
the perceived need not only to thwart obvious threats to
internal order and discipline, but also to bring under
court-martial jurisdiction other misconduct that had only
a remote possible impact on discipline but nonetheless
threatened other military values such as service reputation
in the civilian community. The situs of this expansion was
at the trial level
.
This internal pressure for expansion of the scope of
the general articles is best demonstrated in the emergence
of noncapital civilian crimes as a separate and distinct
theory of general articles liability in Army law. By the
late nineteenth century a rule had emerged to the effect
that civilian crimes could be prosecuted under the Army's
general article only if they actually prejudiced good order
and discipline in a direct and palpable way. Otherwise, a
soldier's crimes against civilian law could be punished by
a court-martial only if committed in time of war, insur-
259
rection, or rebellion. In 1896 Colonel Wmthrop noted
that the rule was observed more in its breach than in
compliance, but he was reluctant to second-guess the
discretion of the commander in close cases
:
59
A.V7. 58 of 1874, R.S. sec. 1342, art. 58.
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A strict rule on this subject, however, has not been
observed in practice; and, especially as the civil
courts do not readily take cognizance of crimes when
committed by soldiers, military commanders generally
lean to the sustaining of the jurisdiction of courts-
martial in cases of crimes so committed against
civilians, particularly when committed on the frontier,
wherever the offence can be viewed as affecting, i_n any
material though inferior degree , the discipline of the
command— a question which may in general, in the judgment
of the author, properly be left to be decided by the
Department, &c, commander, in each instance. 260
By 1901, however, Colonel Winthrop, authoring the
Digest of Opinions, backed away even further from requiring
actual prejudice in cases involving civilian crimes:
"Whether acts committed against civilians are offenses
within this Article is a question to be determined by the
circumstances of each case, and in regard to which no gen-
eral rule can be laid down." In language strikingly
prescient of the factors that the Supreme Court would list
70 years later in Relford v. Commandant as being deter-
minative of whether there was court-martial jurisdiction
over an off-base offense, Winthrop suggested several crite-
ria, any one of which would be sufficient to characterize
a civil crime as sufficiently prejudicial to good order and
discipline to sustain prosecution under the general article:
(1) the offense was committed on or near a military
26
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 725 (emphasis in
original) . Winthrop noted that the fact that the offense
was committed publicly in uniform was generally regarded as
prejudicial to good order and discipline. Id., n. 89.
261Army Dig. Op., 1901, sec. 158, at 62.
262 401 U.S. 355 (1971) .
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reservation; (2) it was committed while the accused was on
duty; (3) it was committed in the presence of other soldiers;
(4) it was committed while the accused was in uniform; or
(5) the accused used his military status or position, or that
of another, in committing the offense.
On the few occasions during this period on which it
considered the general articles, the Supreme Court demon-
strated a similar drift away from a strict application of
264
the "direct and palpable" rule. In Ex parte reason , for
example, the "Jack Ruby" of the 1880s, an army sergeant,
attempted to kill President Garfield's assassin, who was
under his guard at the federal jail in Washington, D.C. In
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Mason contended
that his offense was not directly prejudicial to military
discipline and was therefore not punishable under A.W. 62.
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice White, disagreed,
characterizing his conduct as "an attrocious breach of
265
military discipline". Even though Mason's victim was a
civilian, Mason was performing a military duty because he
had been assigned guard duty. The crime was more than the
civilian offense of assault with intent to kill; instead,
the court characterized it as "assault by a soldier on duty
2 C "3
Army Dig. Op., supra note 261. Cf . Relford v
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355,365 (1971).






with intent to kill a prisoner confined in a jail over
which he was standing guard."
To this extent, Ex parte Mason seems consistent with
the rule as espoused by Winthrop and other commentators of
of the period. The case could also be viewed as merely
deference to the court-martial 's finding that military
discipline has been prejudiced. However, toward the end of
Chief Justice White's opinion, the exact nature of Mason's
offense seems to become confused in language suggestive of
the future development of civil crimes as a distinct theory
of general articles liability:
But when the act charged as "conduct to the prejudice
of good order and military discipline" is actually a
crime against society which is punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary, it seems to us clear that a
court-martial is authorized to inflict that kind of
punishment. The act done is a civil crime, and the
trial is for that act . The proceedings are had in a
court-martial because the offender is personally
amenable to that jurisdiction, and what he did was not
only criminal according to the laws of the land, but
prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the
army to which he belonged. .. 267
In 1901, the Supreme Court again treated direct
prejudice to good order and discipline as a necessary ele-
ment for conviction of a civilian crime under the general
Article. Six years later, in Grafton v. United States,
266 T ,Id .
267
Id. at 6.
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 397 (1901).




the Court, finally recognized what had been slowly developing
in military law for some thirty years: the emergence of a
new, distinct type of general articles offense not requiring
proof of prejudice to good order and discipline. Grafton
had been acquitted by a general court-martial of homicide
charged under A.W. 62 of 1374. He was thereafter tried and
convicted in civilian court of the same homicide under
Philippine law, notwithstanding his plea of autrefois acquit .
The Supreme Court reversed the civilian conviction, holding
that it violated Grafton's Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy, inasmuch as he had already been tried for
the same offense by the Army.
The government argued at the Supreme Court that,
under the rationale of Ex parte Mason , the court-martial
had tried Crafton for a distinct and separate military
offense: homicide to the prejudice of good order and
discipline. The Court punctured this legal fiction, and
gave A.W. 6 2 a much broader reading than had Winthrop and
other nineteenth century commentators:
The crimes referred to in that article manifastly
embrace those not capital, committed by officers
or soldiers of the Army in violation or public law
as enforced by civil power. No crimes committed by
officers or soldiers of the Army are excepted by the
above article from the jurisdiction thus conferred
upon the court-martial, except those that are
capital in nature. While, however, the jurisdiction
of general courts-martial extends to all crimes, not
capital, committed against public law... within the
limits of the territory in which he is serving, this
jurisdiction is not exclusive, but only concurrent,
with that of the civil courts. 2
™
270 Id. at 348
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Grafton is now considered the formal establishment of
what are now commonly called "clause (3) offenses" under
Article 134 of the Uniform Code: "crimes and offenses not
271
capital". In 1916, when the Army's Articles of War were
revised, A.W. 96 replaced the prejudicial conduct article
of the 1874 code and clearly described noncapital civil
crimes as a distinct theory of general articles liability,
independent of concepts of prejudice to good order and
discipline and of service discredit. A.W. 96 of the 1916
code provided:
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the military service, and all crimes and offenses not
capital
,
of which persons subject to military law may
be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general
or special or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense and punished at the
discretion of such court. 272
In summary, then, the law of prejudicial conduct was
founded on ancient values and customs in the military com-
munity concerning what enhances discipline and what jeop-
ardizes it. Although a considerable body of case precedent
developed between the Civil War and World War I, especially
271See J. Snedeker, supra note 16, at 483; Hagen,
supra note 23, at 72-75.
272A.W. 96, Act of August 29, 1916, ch . 418, 39 Stat.
666. At the same time, Congress enacted A.W. 93, 39 Stat.
664-665, which conferred court-martial jurisdiction over
the following offenses previously triable only during was,
insurrection, or rebellion; manslaughter, mayhem, arson,
burglary, robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, assault
with intent to commit any felony, and assault with intent
to do bodily harm.
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in the Army, the ultimate issue of whether given conduct
was prejudicial to good order and discipline was determined
by reference to the customs of the service with respect to
the discipline-preserving values at the heart of the seven
general categories of prejudicial conduct offenses outlined
273
above.
By and large, the system worked well, because those
closest to the problems of preserving discipline, the court-
martial members, played the central role. These "practical
274
men" were also, in a sense, legal oracles, applying
military custom to specific, and often unusual, circum-
stances. These ad hoc panels of officers meeting on the
frontier, overseas, or aboard a ship at sea were accorded
great deference. In a functional sense, they were the law
givers concerning not only prejudicial conduct but, as will
be seen later, also with respect to military common law
generally; and neither military superiors nor civilian
courts were prone to disagree with their findings.
The development of prejudicial conduct law also
demonstrates the limits of custom and military common law.
Once the Army's courts-martial wandered beyond those
offenses directly impacting on military discipline, customs
of the service became little more than desperate legal
273Supra at Part III-B-2.




fictions. Unable to force all misconduct that commanders
and court-martial members thought should be prosecuted
under the general articles into the conceptual limits of
direct and palable prejudice to good order and discipline,
military courts began to grasp at often fanciful risks of
prejudice in cases involving civil noncapital crimes. The
pressure was finally relieved by the divorce of civilian
crimes from the prejudicial conduct concept, and by the
emergence of a separate concept of service discrediting
conduct.
C. Unbecoming Conduct
1. Customary Standards of
Officer Conduct
Article 133 of the Uniform Code prohibits conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. No provision of the
Code presents more difficult questions of definition and
limitation. While "conduct to the prejudice of good order
and discipline" is equally amorphous on its face, it at
least compels the application of reasonably definite customs
and values concerning the preservation of discipline to the
actual facts and circumstances of the accused's conduct.
"Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman", by con-
trast, seems to turn the court-martial into a judicial
seance, conjuring up the ideal officer, who is by nature
and military position also the model nineteenth century
gentleman or lady, a person possessing the most highly
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prized personal attributes of that age: personal honor,
trustworthiness, sobriety, decorum, and devotion to duty.
The twentieth century accused is then compared to this
spectre
.
Unbecoming conduct is more than bad manners, and has
been considered for centuries to be one of the more serious
violations of military law. In the Army codes, dismissal
under dishonorable conditions was mandated for any officer
convicted of unbecoming conduct. The U.S. Navy had no
specific article mandating dismissal, but the usual conse-
quence of conviction of unbecoming conduct under the Navy's
general article was the same. The severity of the customary
penalty for unbecoming conduct implies the seriousness of
the misconduct contemplated: that which not only comprises
one's personal character, but also compromises his or her
standing as an officer, with the responsibilities and
authority that an officer's status legally and customarily
implies
What standard is expected of officers? The current
Manual , in language with a pronounced nineteenth century
tone, sketches the ideal officer, but with only broad
pencil strokes:
There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal
officer and the perfect gentleman, a lack of which is
indicated by acts of dishonesty or unfair dealing, of
indecency or indecorum, or of lawlessness, injustice,
or cruelty. Not everyone is or can be expected to
meet ideal moral standards, but there is a limit of
tolerance below which the individual standards of an
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officer, cadet, or midshipman cannot fall without
seriously compromising his standing as an officer,
cadet, or midshipman or his character as a gentle-
man. 275
The Manual links personal honor to professional
standing. Unbecoming conduct can therefore be committed by
official or private misconduct. Misconduct in one's offi-
cial capacity is unbecoming if, "in dishonoring or dis-
gracing the individual as an officer" it also ''seriously
compromises his character as a gentleman 11 . Private mis-
conduct "in dishonoring or disgracing the individual per-
sonally" must also seriously compromise his or her standing
._. 276
as an officer.
The concept of unbecoming conduct was the second
distinct class of offenses to emerge from the military
common law. It was rooted in two attributes of separateness
(1) the separateness of military society and its fundamental
value of discipline; and (2) the distinct and higher stan-
dard of personal conduct expected of officers, whose leader-
ship, if it is to be effective, must be sustained not just
by the legal forces of their orders, but by personal example
Unbecoming conduct thus prejudiced discipline by weakening
the moral authority of officers over their subordinates.





2. The Emergence of the
Unbecoming Conduct Concept
Unbecoming conduct did not appear in the military
codes until the eighteenth century. Among the earliest
provisions in the British articles was the following provi-
sion from the British naval articles of 1749: "If any Flag
Officer, Captain, or Commander, or Lieutenant belonging to
the Fleet, shall be convicted before a Court Martial of
behaving in a scandalous, infamous, cruel, oppressive, or
fraudulent Manner, unbecoming the Character of an Officer,
277he shall be dismissed from his Majesty's Service." The
British army's articles of 1765 likewise stated: "Whatso-
ever Commissioned Officer shall be convicted before a
General Court-Martial of behaving in a scandalous infamous
Manner, such as is unbecoming the Character of an Officer
278
and a Gentleman, shall be discharged from Our service.''
The appearance of unbecoming conduct in the codes did
not, however, signal the creation of a new military offense
As John McArthur suggested in his 1813 treatise, unbecoming
conduct had long been a part of the military common law of
277
22 Geo. 2, c. 33, art. XXXIII (1749).
27 8Articles of War of 1765, supra note 100, sec. XV,
art. XXIII, reprinted in W. Winthrop, supra note 49, app.
VII, at 945. As noted previously, identical language was
used in the British Articles of War of 1774 and, with only




279both the British army and the Royal Navy. Moreover, its
relatively late appearance in the codes, and the position
of the unbecoming conduct articles in the organization of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century codes, suggest
that the intent was not to create a new military offense,
but merely to prescribe a mandatory punishment for an offi-
cer convicted of unbecoming conduct as defined by military
custom.
The British codes particularly were not a rambling
catalog of offenses, but were in both services clearly
organized, structured systems of military justice. In the
British naval articles of 1749, the unbecoming conduct
article was the first of four articles concerning how
certain classes of offenses were to be punished, and were
distinct from Articles II through XXXII, which listed
specific offenses. In the British Articles of War of 1765,
the organization was even clearer. Unbecoming conduct
appeared in Section XV, "Administration of Justice", the
articles which set forth court-martial procedures and
punishments to be imposed in special circumstances. The
punitive articles were contained in Sections I through
XIII. The early American army articles adopted a similar
organization. If fact, it was not until 1874 that unbe-
coming conduct was moved from the procedural sections of
1 J. McArthur, supra note 70, at 49, 106. McArthur




the Articles of War to the end of the punitive articles,
signalling the emergence since 1806 of unbecoming conduct
as a distinct constellation of substantive offenses.
In the early nineteenth century British courts-martial
had already broadly construed "unbecoming the Character of
an Officer and a Gentleman". The customary standards of
conduct expected of a British officer were applied to a
variety of misconduct. Records of Royal Navy courts-martial
include dismissals for unbecoming conduct such as the
following: selling one's sword, sash, and clothes, and
280
"keeping low company"; allowing oneself to be ejected
2 81from a coffee house; treating another officer with "fre-
2 8 2quent abuse and unof ficer-like behavior"; and drunkenness,
sleeping on watch, and repeated insolence to a superior
28 3
officer. Examples of unbecoming conduct in the British
army during the same period include: accepting money in
return for discharges, pardoning deserters for money, and
284false entries in the orderly book; returning to duty
280 Rex v. Steel (KMS GRAFTON 1759 ( reported in 2 J.
McArthur, supra note 70, app. XXXIII, at 4 23.
281
Rex v. Loake (KMS REPULSE 1763) reported in id. at
426.
282Rex v. Titchborne (HMS BUCKINGHAM 1771) reported
in id. at 429.
Rex v. Drummond (HMS SEAHORSE 1774) reported in id
284 Rex v. Cawthorne (Westminster Reg. of Middlesex
1795) reported in C. James, supra note 208, at 1-21.
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after having promised to resign one's commission, and an
285
altercation with another officer in the mess; personally
insulting another officer in the mess with "most indecent
expressions", "outrageously breaking windows", and "con-
o q c
ducting himself in a very riotous manner" while on duty;
assaulting an innkeeper, then publicly defying one's com-
28 7
manding officer to prove the misconduct; outrageously
disturbing a private party where present as a guest by
using abusive language to another member of his regiment
288
and waylaying him afterward; "keeping company with




, a journeyman baker and a tinman's apprentice";
ordering soldiers of the town guard to break open an ale
290 291house; public boxing; price-gouging on the sale of
28o Rex v. Robertson (North British Militia 1801)
,
reported in id. at 78-80.
°Rex v. Beerling (1st Surrey Reg. of Militia 1801),
reported in id. at 85-86.
Rex v. Wilkens and Spunner (55th Reg. of Foot 1802),
reported in id. at 106-109.
288
Rex v. Carmichael (25th Reg. of Foot 1803)
,
reported in id . at 134-36.
peg
Rex v. Myers (1st Reg. of Foot 1806) and Rex v.
Duckett (37th Reg. of Foot 1806), reported in id. at 204-207.
" y0 Rex v. Duckett (37th Reg. of Foot 1306) , reported
in id. at 219-220. With two general courts-martial in less
than a year, Lt. John Taylor Duckett was apparently a one-
man crime wave in the 37th Regiment.
91Rex v. Stevenson (6th West India Reg. 1807)
,




uniforms and keeping false accounts.
On the other hand, not all disorderly conduct by offi-
cers was found sufficiently unbecoming to warrant dismissal.
Thus, the King disapproved a conviction for throwing a glass
of wine in the face of a regimental surgeon because, although
"extremely disorderly", it was not sufficiently scandalous
293
or infamous. Likewise, under the peculiar circumstances
of the case, beating a debilitated man and bragging about it
to several soldiers nearby was held by a court-martial not
to be unbecoming conduct because of the victim's provocation
294
of the incident. Witnessing and promoting drunkenness
and "excesses" among a group of privates, while found to be
an offense prejudicial to good order and discipline, was
helf not sufficiently scandalous or infamous to constitute
295
unbecoming conduct.
Thus scandal and infamy seemed to be at the heart of
the British concept of unbecoming conduct. American prac-
tice, however, soon dropped the requirement that the offi-
cer's conduct be "scandalous and infamous". Although the
early American articles required, as did their British
292 Rex v. Hewetson (2d Batn. of 9th Reg. 1303)
,
reported in id. at 275-78.
293 Rex v. Lawson (Cumberland Reg. of Militia 1803),
reported in id. at 138-39.
294 Rex v. Blake and O'Mealy (16th Lt. Dragoons 1802),
reported in id . at 280-81.
295Rex v. Jolliffe(M. Hants Reg. of Militia 1813),
reported in id. at 515-18.
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models, that the officer's conduct must be "scandalous and
. . 296infamous" to be unbecoming under military law, the 1806
revisions of the Articles of War delected "scandalous and
297infamous" from the unbecoming conduct article. Steven
Vincent Benet, quoting extensively from an 1852 review by
the Secretary of War in an unbecoming conduct case, stated
that by dropping "scandalous and infamous", Congress
intended that it no longer be necessary to allege or prove
298that an officer's conduct was scandalous or infamous.
George Davis, writing three decades later, maintained that
the purpose of the 1806 amendment was merely to alleviate
299
confusion with the common law meaning of "infamous".
One modern scholar, relying on Benet and Winthrop, has
surmised that the purpose of the deletion was to promote a
higher standard of conduct among officers by lowering the
threshold of criminal liability for unbecoming conduct.
The Navy's articles were never so amended. As noted
previously, the U.S. Navy never had an article specifically
296
E.g., Articles of War of 1775, art. 47 quoted in
Part II-B-1, supra .
A.W. 83 of 1806, 2 Stat. 359, quoted supra note
116.
29 8
S. Benet, supra note 152, at 176.
299
G. Davis, supra note 15, at 468.
Ackroyd, The General Articles, Articles 133 and
134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice , 35 St. John's
L. Rev. 264, 272 (1961), citing W. Winthrop, supra note 49,
at 710-11, and S. Benet, supra note 152, at 274-77.
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prohibiting unbecoming conduct, which was instead punished
under the Navy's single general article. "Scandalous
conduct" was a separate offense in the American naval
30
1
articles, applicable to both officers and enlisted men.
Scandalous conduct therefore continued to be prosecuted in
the naval half of American military law until the enactment
302
of the Uniform Code.
In the Army, even after the 180 6 amendments to the
Articles of War, "scandalous and infamous" remained a viable
concept in the law of unbecoming conduct, although it was no
longer a sine qua non for conviction. According to Deliart,
writing in 1846, the concept "must necessarily be understood
as implied in order to give the unbecoming conduct article
301
Act of April 23, 1800, art. 3, 1 Stat. 45-46,
quoted in Part II-B-2, supra . A.G.N. 8, R.S. sec. 1624,
art. 8 (1), provided: "Such punishment as a court-martial
shall adjudge may be inflicted on any person in the navy...
guilty of profane swearing, falsehood, drukeness, gambling,
fraud, theft, or any other scandalous conduct tending to
the destruction of good morals."
See , e.g., United States v. Case, C.M.O. 6-1914
(Navy 1914) (officer exposing self while drunk and lying on
couch in country club cloakroom) ; United States v. Carpenter,
G. C.M.O. 121 (Navy 1897) (homosexual acts by enlisted man
with another sailor); United States v. Dodd, G. C.M.O. 23
(Navy 1895) (surreptitious removal of belongings by officer
from rooming house to evade paying rent) ; United States v.
Fillette, G. C.M.O. 55 (Navy 1894) (officer enticing high
school student to elope); United States v. Brown, G. C.M.O.
6 (Navy 1888) (petty officer returning from AWOL drunk and
threatening to shoot self with loaded revolver) ; United
States v. Brown, G. C.M.O. 3 (Navy 1887) (officer attending
meeting of a secret society where enlisted men asked "highly




a proper application." Winthrop, writing 90 years after
the 1806 amendment, believed that even though the scandalous
nature of the accused's conduct no longer needed to be
proven, the concept remained at the core of unbecoming
conduct laws
:
It is only required that it should be "unbecoming"
—
a comprehensive term including not only all that is
conveyed by the words "scandalous" and "infamous'"
but more. At the same time the original phraseology
is properly borne in mind as indicating that, to
become the subject of a charge, the unbecoming conduct
should be not slight but of a material and pronounced
character. 304
Along with a lingering connotation of scandal, even
after 1805, concepts of honor and disgrace also were an
important part of the law of unbecoming conduct, and also
a source of some uncertainty. All the major commentators
of the nineteenth century agreed that, by law and military
305
custom, an officer was presumed to be a gentleman, sub-
ject to a higher standard of private and official conduct
than were civilians or enlisted personnel. As one judge
commented in 1891, "In military life there is a higher code
termed honor, which holds its society to stricter account-
ability; and it is not desirable that the standards of the
Army shall come down to the requirements of a criminal
303
W. DeHart, supra note 17, at 370.
304
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 711.
305
Id. at 711; W. DeHart, supra note 17, at 371-75;
G. Davis, supra note 15, at 468-69; F. Dudley, Military Law





code." But need disgrace or dishonor be present in
every case of unbecoming conduct? Davis maintained that
307disgrace and dishonor were inherent in unbecoming conduct,
as did DeKart. Winthrop, writing at the same time as
Davis, wasn't sure. While he defined unbecoming conduct as
being of a nature to "offend so seriously against law,
justice, morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace,
309
socially or as a man, the offender", he also pointed out
that it was not essential that the act be intrinsically
dishonorable. Colonel Winthrop quoted General Hancock's
reviewing action in an 1867 court-martial:
It is not considered that the conduct of an officer
should necessarily affect his honor to make him subject
to a charge laid under this Article. An officer may be
guilty, in the heat of passion, of conduct properly as
laid, without affecting his honor... Although dishonor-
able conduct is conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, the converse of the proposition is not
always true. 310
Professor Edgar Dudley, writing in 1908, went a bit
farther than Winthrop, and flatly rejected scandal and dis-
honor as necessary concepts in the law of unbecoming
Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. CI. 541, 563
(1891), aff'd in part and rev'd in part , 148 U.S. 84
(1893) .
307
G. Davis, supra note 15, at 469-70.
30 3
W. DeHart, supra note 17, at 371.
309
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 711.





When then is the standard of the officer? Because of
the inherent difficulty that notions of dishonor, disgrace,
and scandal posed, military courts in the nineteenth century
synthesized a more workable concept to identify unbecoming
conduct: the extent to which the offender's status as an
officer has been compromised. General McClellan, in his
action reviewing a Civil War case, stated, "military men do
not consider the charge sustained unless the evidence shows
the accused to be one with whom his brother officers cannot
312
associate without loss of self respect." Davis charac-
terized the officer guilty of unbecoming conduct as "an
unfit associate for officers and gentlemen'" whose "expulsion
from the society of such is necessary to the preservation
313 . .
of tne respect due them as a class." Writing in the
Digest of Opinions of 1830, Colonel Winthrop viewed this
functional definition of unbecoming conduct as the logical
consequence of the punishment mandated by the Articles of
War: "The Article, in making the punishment of dismissal
imperative in all cases, evidently contemplates that the
while unfitting the party of the society of men of a scru-
pulous sense of decency and honor, shall exhibit him as
311
E. Dudley, supra note 306, at 409.
312G.O. Ill, Army of the Potomac (1862)
,
quoted in W
Winthrop, supra note 49, at 712, n. 25.
313




unworthy to hold a commission in the army." In his 1896
treatise, Colonel Winthrop concluded that the most reliable
test of unbecoming conduct is "(tlhe fitness... of the
accused to hold a commission in the army, as discovered by
the nature of the behaviour complained of, or rather his
worthiness, morally, to remain in it after and in view of
315
such behaviour..."
Thus, the question for the court-martial members was
whether the officer's conduct was so bad as to necessitate
316his expulsion from the society of officers. The members,
all officers themselves prior to the enactment of the Uni-
form Code, were therefore required to draw on their knowl-
edge of military custom concerning acceptable conduct for
officers. The functional test espoused by the commentators
could operate only in the context of service custom. Pro-
fessor Dudley therefore explained that each case was
decided
according to the circumstances of each case, by the
court-martial trying it, in accordance with the
314Army Dig. Op., 1380, sec, at 38.
315
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 712-13.
3 1 ft
Although dismissal was not mandatory in the Navy
for unbecoming conduct, which was prosecuted under the
Navy's single general article, this functional test appears
to have operated in officer cases, especially those alleged
as scandalous conduct. See , e.g., United States v. Grimes,
G. O. 150 at 3 (Navy 1870) , where the circumstances of an
officer's failure to pay a debt "are of a character so




recognized customs and usages of the service and the
general sentiment of the Army and community at large
as to what is accepted as morally unbefitting and
unworthy in a man of honor; that is to say a man of a
high sense of justice, an elevated standard of morals
and manners, and the corresponding deportment, which
constitute the "gentleman" which every officer of the
Army is bound by law to be. 317
Davis pointed out that the standard expected of an officer
and gentleman is merely military custom applied to the
specific facts in each case:
The effect of the Article is to establish a standard
of conduct in respect to commissioned officers of the
Army, and to give to material departures from such
standard the character of serious military offenses.
The particular acts or classes of acts which constitute
such departures from the standard established in the
Article are determined in part by custom of service
and in part, ... by an application of the terms of the
Article to particular acts or omissions which are set
forth in the charges and specifications . 318
Unbecoming conduct, like prejudicial conduct, was a
body of jury-made law, with the court-martial members
drawing on their knowledge of military customs concerning
the deportment expected of officers and the potential
effects of officer misconduct on military society. As
Dellart summarized in 1846:
The article in question does not particularize any
species of conduct as unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman, but leaves that to be determined by the
opinions of the world, or by those of the court -
martial, from the acts alleged, and from which the
military community might be prejudiced or receive
detriment, were it to countenance behavior in any
317
E. Dudley, supra note 306, at 409 (emphasis added)
318
G. Davis, supra note 15, at 468.
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of its members which was of such a nature as to
involve scandal and infamy. 319
3. The Scope of Unbecoming Conduct
Given the central role of the court-martial members in
establishing the standards of conduct expected of an offi-
cer, and in measuring an accused's actions against such a
customary standard, it is not surprising that during the
formative years of American general articles law a wide
variety of misconduct was held to be unbecoming conduct.
Colonel Winthrop's treatise cited 68 distinct examples of
unbecoming conduct, grouped into 28 general categories.
Mis list, although fairly representative of Army unbecoming
conduct cases, did not include Navy courts-martial, which
generally included a slightly broader scope of impropriety
under unbecoming conduct, reserving the more outrageous
319
W. DeHart, supra note 17, at 371 (emphasis added)
.
DeHart did not explain what "the opinions of the world"
were. Presumably he was alluding to a universal moral or
ethical consensus common to both military and civilian
societies, which the court-martial members would apply
along with specialized military customs and values. Note
the subtle relationship DeHart drew between unbecoming
conduct and prejudicial conduct ("from which the military
community might be prejudiced or receive detriment"), as
well as the possible suggestion of service discredit ("were
it to countenance behavior in any of its members which was





incidents for prosecution as scandalous conduct. Most
unbecoming conduct cases during this period could be
classified into one of seven broad categories. Like the
321
categories of prejudicial conduct described previously,
each of the following classifications involved the breach
of a standard of personal honor, decorum, or deportment
customarily expected of officers. Some of the categories
correspond to classes of prejudicial conduct; in such cases,
the only distinguishing characteristic was often the enlisted
status of the accused convicted of prejudicial conduct, which
3?2
made him immune from prosecution for unbecoming conduct.
Another reason for the similarities between the categories
of prejudicial conduct and unbecoming conduct was that pre-
judicial conduct was recognized as a lesser included offense
320 The Navy did not seem to prosecute unbecoming con-
duct as such to the same relative extent as did the Army.
Most of the cases between the Civil War and World War I
that involved conduct that would have been prosecuted as
unbecoming conduct in the Army were prosecuted as scandalous
conduct in the Navy, although it was also common Navy prac-
tice to prefer two charges arising out of the same miscon-
duct: one, under A.G.N. 8, alleging scandalous conduct; and
the other, under A.G.N. 22, alleging conduct unbecoming an
officer and gentleman. See , e.g. , United States v. Coghlan,
G.C.M.O. 209 (Navy 1376) . The accused wrote ana mailed a
"profane, scurrilous, and ungentlemanly " letter to a Navy
clerk. Ke was convicted, under Charge I, of unbecoming
conduct "in violation of his duty as a gentleman, and of the
laws of decency, decorum, and morality, which are incumbent
upon every officer in the Naval service", and, under Charge
II, of scandalous conduct, by which he violated "good morals,
and set an evil example to others in like manner to offend."
321 Part III-B-2, supra .
322
See W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 732. Conduct
that, if committed by an officer, would be punished as unbe-
coming conduct was prosecuted as prejudicial conduct when
committed by enlisted men.
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of unbecoming conduct. Thus, an officer whose misconduct
was not so serious as to compromise his standing as an
officer could be convicted of prejudicial conduct for the
323
same transgression.
By 1900, then conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman could be divided into the following seven broad,
and occasionally overlapping, classifications:
1. Frauds and falsifications . These included specific
offenses such as knowingly making false official statements
324
or accounts; defamatory statements, especially concerning
325
another officer; and other "[a]cts of fraud or gross
323
Id . at 719; see , e.g., United States v. Meade,
G.C.M.O. 29 (Navy 1832) (abusive language and fighting with
another officer in the presence of enlisted men not unbe-
coming under the circumstances, but prejudicial to good
order and discipline) . Many such convictions of the lesser
included offense appear to have been acts of jury nullifi-
cation, for Winthrop admonished: "The penalty being thus
imperative, the court, where an offence duly charged under
the Article is fully established, cannot properly evade its
responsibility as to the sentence by finding the accused
guilty only of 'Conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline, ' and affixing a lighter punishment.
It must find according to the testimony and attach the
statutory sentence, those members who consider this too
severe joining, if desired in a recommendation for commuta-




Id. at 713; see United States v. Seely, G.O. 148
(Navy 1869) (deliberate misrepresentation to commanding
officer that two sailors had not been given" unlawful and
cruel punishments and tortures", probably flogging).
325
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 713-14.
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falsity, cheats, or other corrupt conduct" .
2. Abuse or compromise of rank . Officers are
expected to look out for the welfare of their subordinates,
not victimize them. Thus, largest areas of unbecoming con-
duct law involved abuses of one's military position and
other acts inconsistent with one's position, such as:
327 3 28
extortion of enlisted men; usury against enlisted men;
329




3. Compromise of personal honor or reputation . This
class included the often vaguely articulated transgressions
against the code of the gentleman, especially involving the
3 26
Id . at 716, citing examples such as: fraudulently
drawing rations for one's wife; fraudulent overcharges by a
commissary officer to food sold to soldiers and officers;
cheating at cards; and taking leave intended for another
officer. See , e.g_., United States v. Harman, C.M.O. 10-1917
(Navy 1917) (paymaster taking advantage of mistake by trades-
man who delivered to ship's store articles of greater value
than those ordered, and failure to notify the tradesman
promptly of the mistake) . Most frauds committed by naval
officers were prosecuted as scandalous conduct.
327
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 716, n. 45.
Id .
329
Id . at 715, n. 53. See , e.g., United States v.
McCalla, G. C.M.O. 29 (Navy 1890) (threatening to kill a sea-
man apprentice with a sword if he smiles) ; United States v.




W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 716, citing examples
such as drinking, gambling, and "unbecomingly familiar
association" with enlisted men.
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dishonorable failure of an officer to fulfill an obligation,
331
such as a dishonorable failure to pay a just debt, or
332
violation of a formal pledge, or other violation of per-
333
sonal or official trust.
4. Immoral behavior . A variety of violations of the
sexual and social taboos were prosecuted as unbecoming con-
duct; although the unbecoming aspect in most cases was not
so much the moral depravity evidenced by the behavior itself,
but the accused officer's indiscretion in getting caught.
Examples of such cases include bigamy, public association
with a notorious prostitute, and frequenting a house of ill-
331
Id . at 715, n. 42; see , e.g., United States v.
Braunersreuther, G.C.M.O. 36 (Navy 1881) . Cf . United States
v. Grimes, G.O. 150 (Navy 1870) (borrowing $200 from wardroom
steward, an enlisted man, depositing one's commissions as




W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 718, citing examples
of violations of formal pledges not to drink and not to enter
a gambling house; see , e.g., United States v. Frary, G.C.M.O.
31 (Navy 1882) (violation of pledge not to drink) . Cf . United
States v. Hartrath, G.C.M.O. 21 (Navy 1894) (violation of
abstinence pledge prosecuted as scandalous conduct)
.
333
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 714, citing numerous
examples of violations of finanical or fiduciary trust. In
the Navy, most serious violations of financial trust were
prosecuted as scandalous conduct. See, e.g., United States
v. Fisher, G.C.M.O. 10 (Navy 1889) (misappropriation of com-
pany fund to buy haycutter for personal use) ; United States
v. Marstin, G.O. 67 (Navy 1865) (Marine lieutenant colonel's
embezzlement of $8,000 from enlisted men's money entrusted
to him for safekeeping). Cf. United States v. Masten, G.O.
149 (Navy 1870) (failure by
-







5. Drunken misconduct . Drunken, disorderly behavior
in public or in the presence of enlisted men, was considered
a very serious breach of the standard of conduct expected
of an officer; although drunkenness by itself, without any
accompanying unseemly behavior, was not generally considered
335
to be unbecoming conduct.
6. Disgraceful public behavior . This general clas-
sification would include a variety of public misconduct,
not involving liquor or sexual mores, that tends to discredit
~>
-J £
the officer. Examples would include public altercations;
337
wanton damage or destruction of the property of civilians,
use of provoking, abusive, obscene, or vulgar language,
334
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 718, n. 54. By
contrast, the Navy during this period did not appear to
prosecute sexual misconduct as vigorously as did the Army,
although by 1917 some particularly outrageous acts were
being prosecuted as scandalous conduct. See , e.g., United
States v. West, C.M.O. 24-1914 (Navy 1914) (requesting
another officer to procure a woman for illicit intercourse)
;
United States v. Carpenter, G. C.M.O. 121 (Navy 1897) (homo-
sexual acts with a sailor)
.
335
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 717. See , e.g.,
United States v. Strong, G. C.M.O. 19 (Navy 1887) (drunken,
disorderly conduct while ashore on the foreign concession
at Canton, China "so as to excite general remark")
.
3 ~K fi
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 714; see e.g.,
United States v. Huff, C.M.O. 26-1914 (Navy 1914) (fighting
with a civilian in a hotel)
.
337




especially toward subordinates or civilians; and other
"disorderly or violent conduct of a disreputable character
339in public".
7. Commission of a civilian felony . Although such
prosecutions as unbecoming conduct were rare in the Navy,
the Army frequently prosecuted officers for committing
civilian felonies, such as larceny, receiving stolen prop-
erty, robbery, and homicide.
Perhaps to even a greater extent than with prejudicial
conduct, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
remained rooted in custom. The court-martial of an officer
charged with unbecoming conduct was in some ways like a
tribal rite, by which the offending officer would be cast
out of the society of officers for violations of the un-
written code of conduct. Other than the somewhat vague
guidance provided by treatises such as Winthrop ' s , the
court-martial members were left to their own sense of pro-
priety and knowledge of military customs governing officer
conduct. Therefore, the law of unbecoming conduct demon-
strated the same expansive growth in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, as the military courts were faced
3 38
Id . at 714; see , e.g., United States v. Mintzer,
G.C.M.O. 23 (Navy 1886) (obscene, vulgar, profane, and
abusive language, also charged as scandalous conduct)
;
United States v. Fitzsimmons, G.C.M.O. 31 (Navy 1881)
(profane, abusive and insulting language at mess)
.





Indeed, custom may well have had an even more pro-
nounced expansive effect in unbecoming-conduct law than in
prejudicial conduct. In the latter body of law, military
courts were usually punishing conduct long recognized as
detrimental to discipline; and, as by the close of the
nineteenth century a substantial body of case precedent had
developed. In unbecoming conduct, however, the governing
customs were more vaguely conceptualized and articulated in
terms of honor, disgrace, and position. As such, they were
more susceptible of application to a broader range of spe-
cific conduct.
Unbecoming conduct also required a more careful
application of custom than appears to have been the practice
in prejudicial conduct cases. Identical conduct could be
highly dishonorable and unbecoming in one set of circum-
stances, yet not unbecoming in another somewhat similar
situation. By contrast, conduct prejudicial to discipline
in one situation was frequently prejudicial in all similar
circumstances. Thus, because of the nonspecific nature of
the customs applied, and the resulting need for a discrim-
inating analysis of the facts in each case the trial of an
unbecoming conduct case was an operation of military common
law, through the reliance on service custom as a source of
substantive law and the application of custom to novel fac-





341Although some scholars suggest that service dis-
crediting conduct was new with the 1916 Articles of War,
the concept of service discredit clearly operated in Amer-
ican military law throughout the nineteenth century.
The first such manifestation of the concept in the
nineteenth century was in the prejudicial conduct cases,
especially in the Army. The expansive pressure that built
up in the prejudicial conduct law, especially in cases
involving civilian crimes that had not apparent relation to
. . . 342
military discipline, has already been explored. In
reading these cases, especially the ones after 1880, the
core value that can arguably support many of the convictions
is not a direct and palpable impact on discipline, but
rather the potential complications that embarrassing or
discrediting conduct by soldiers and sailors can pose for
the accomplishment of mission. This was particularly true
on the frontier, where the military and civilian populations
lived in a close, symbiotic relationship.
The concept of service discredit was also a frequent
undertone in unbecoming conduct cases. One of the operational
See , e.g_., Hagan, supra note 23, at 74-77; see
generally Comment, An Unrestricted Anachronism, supra note
24, at 825-34.
342 Part III-B-3, supra.
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definitions of unbecoming conduct was that it shamed or
embarrassed officers as a class, both within the military
organizations, as in offenses involving disgraceful conduct
in the presence of enlisted mem, and in civilian society,
as suggested by the many convictions for public disorders
and immoral behavior. DeHart, exhibiting a global view
rare among nineteenth century commentators, identified two
core values in unbecoming conduct law: unbecoming conduct's
"tendency to affect good order and military discipline" and
its "moral turpitude of such a kind as would reflect dis-
343
credit upon the military community." Moreover, DeHart
viewed service discredit as one of two alternate conceptual
requirements for conviction of unbecoming conduct:
In every prosecution before a court-martial for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, the degree of
the offence must be such as to reflect discredit upon
the body of the army, or the nature of it such as to
militate against the requirements of good order and
military discipline. .. 344
Colonel Winthrop also recognized the role of service dis-
credit in unbecoming conduct, which "at the same time must
be of such a nature or committed under such circumstances










W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 711-12; see also
Comment, An Unrestricted Anachronism , supra note 24 , at
825-27, wherein a student commentator suggests that the
discredit clause of Article 134, U.C.M.J., may have evolved
from the "higher code" applicable to officers.
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In the Navy, service discredit was implicit in many
scandalous conduct prosecutions. Scandalous conduct
specifications frequently alleged discredit or disgrace to
the service. For example, in 1884 a group of Navy enlisted
men were convicted of scandalous conduct arising out of
their "riotous, disorderly, and violent" behavior as pas-
sengers aboard a civilian steamer, intimidating and dis-
turbing other passengers "to the great scandal and disgrace
346
of the naval service." Other examples of service dis-
crediting scandalous conduct include violation of procure-
ment procedures and conflicts of interest in procurement of
347government supplies; and contempt of a state court,
failure to repay a civilian who posted bond for the officer,
348
and failure to pay one's civilian attorney. By 1900,
allegations of service discredit or disgrace had become
common boilerplate language in scandalous conduct specifi-
cations .
Therefore, service discredit was an active concept in
general articles law well before its codification in the
Articles of War of 1916. Whether the immediate, purpose of
including "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the military service" in A.W. 96 of 1916 was to recognize
an already active concept in military law is highly
United States v. Lind and Oliver, G.C.M.O. 39
(Navy 1884)
.
347United States v. Smith, G.C.M.O. 8 (Navy 1886)
.
348United States v. Jounson, G.C.M.O. 24 (Navy 1886).
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speculative. The legislative history of the 1916 code
points to other concerns as prompting the addition. The
Judge Advocate General of the Array explained the sole
purpose of the service discredit language as being to
extend court-martial jurisdiction to retired personnel:
We have a great many retired noncommissioned officers
and soldiers distributed throughout the body of our
population and a great many retired officers. If the
retired officer does anything discreditable to the
service or to his officer position we can try him. .
.
for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman".
We cannot try the noncommissioned officer or soldier
under that article, nor can we try him for conduct
prejudicial to good order and military discipline;
because the act of a man on the retired list, away
from the military post, cannot be reasonably said to
affect military discipline. I threw in that language
to cover the cases of those men. 349
Even if this was the single purpose of the 1916
legislation, its effect was not so limited. Service dis-
credit, which had previously operated sub silentio in Army
. . 350
military law, became a substantive firestorm. The 1917
Manual for Courts-Martial described the purpose quoted above
as a "principal object" of the phrase, but also noted that
there was "a limited field for the application of this part
of the general article to soldiers on the active list in
cases where their discreditable conduct is not punishable
349 Revision of the Articles of War, 1912-1920, at 83
(n.d.), quoted in Hagan, supra note 23, at 75.
350James Hagan has carefully documented the rapid
expansion of the substantive limits of service discrediting
conduct after 1916, particularly with respect to commission
of state or local crimes. See id. at 74-78.
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by any specific article or by the other parts of the gen-
3^1
eral article." By 1928, the Manual had relegated the
Judge Advocate General's "single purpose" even further,
from a "principal purpose" down to little more than an
352
afterthought. The 1921 Manual even suggested that
violations of state or local laws were service discrediting
per se, although this position was modified considerably in
the 1928 edition. 353
With the possible exception of violations of state
and local criminal laws--which notwithstanding the cautions
of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial were generally regarded
by military courts prior to the mid-1950s as discrediting
per se—service discredit law operated in the same common law
way as did prejudicial conduct and unbecoming conduct. The
accused's conduct was, in theory at least, assessed accord-
ing to customs concerning disgrace to the military service
and its reputation in the civilian community. Not surpris-
ingly, the scope of conduct punishable as service discred-
iting mushroomed between 1916 and 1951. The Army military
justice system gave birth to dozens of "new" offenses under
351M.C.M., 1917, para. 446, at 283 (emphasis added).
352M.C.M., 1928, para. 152b, at 188: "One object of
including this phrase in the general article was...".
353M.C.M., 1921, para. 446, at 642-63; cf. M.C.M.,
1928, supra note 353: "Instances of such conduct on the
part of persons subject to military law may include acts in
violation of local law committed under such circumstances





military law, most of them sounding in service discredit.
Many of these offenses were ones that had a long history of
being prosecuted as unbecoming conduct--particularly of-
fenses involving immoral behavior or disgraceful public
354
conduct —or under attenuated theories of prejudice to
good order and discipline.
On the other hand, there did not appear to be the
same careful consideration of the facts of each case as was
demonstrated in unbecoming conduct. Unlike unbecoming
conduct; many of the service discrediting offenses were so
aggravated that it would be almost impossible to hypothesize
circumstances under which they would not tend to discredit
the military. Thus, by 1951, a substantial and somewhat
inflexibly applied body of case precedent had developed.
Custom of the service was invoked only when a court-martial
was confronted with an offense truly hitherto unknown to
military law.
354 See, e.g_., M.C.M., 1949, para. 117c at 138-142,
which lists general articles offenses sounding in service
discredit such as adultry, indecent assault, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault on a female under age 16, negli-
gent homicide, bad check offenses, drunken driving, pan-
dering, receiving stolen goods, and wrongful carnal knowl-
edge with a famale under age 16.

IV. THE ROLE OF CUSTOM UNDER THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICF
A. The Two Meanings of Custom
As the three major classes of general articles offenses
emerged from military common law and were crystallized in the
general articles, custom not only provided the legal standards
against which individual conduct would be measured in general
articles cases, but it also permitted a continuing expansion
of the substantive scope of prejudicial conduct, unbecoming
conduct, and service discrediting conduct. Rather than limit
the scope of the general articles, custom allowed the sub-
stantive boundaries of general articles law to be elastic.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, custom of
the service continues to perform its historic function as a
source of substantive military law. The misunderstanding
of custom's effect on military law, such as is reflected in
Parker v. Levy , is due to the practice of military appellate
courts to invoke custom in two distinct ways, each with its
own particular meaning. One meaning of custom is best
summarized by the phrase "legal custom." This is simply
military case precedent. The other meaning given to custom
by the military appellate courts is that of custom in its




military law, enforcing the values, norms, folkways, and
traditions of the service. This second type of custom may
be called "societal custom" in that it reflects values and
usage of military society.
It is very important to understand which type of
custom is being invoked in a given case, because each
meaning has its own implications for the determination of
criminality under the general articles. Legal custom
generally has tended to limit the scope of the general
articles, while societal custom has continued, as it did in
the nineteenth century, to be an expansive force. Invoca-
tion of legal custom usually implies, at the appellate
level, a characterization of whether an accused's conduct
is, for example, prejudicial to good order and discipline
as a legal issue freely reviewable on appeal. Reliance on
societal custom, on the other hand implies that this issue
is one of fact to be determined by the trial court, and
reversible only if clearly erroneous.
B. Custom Confused: Legal Custom and the
Per Se Characterization of General
Articles Misconduct
Appellate decisions under the Uniform Code have fre-
quently confused custom with military case precedent. Under
legal custom analysis of a general articles case, whether
particular conduct is cognizable under Article 133 or 134 is
decided by inquiring whether the conduct has customarily
been prosecuted under the general articles, and not whether
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the conduct, under the circumstances, prejudiced discipline,
tended to discredit the service, or was unbecoming. Although
this distinction is subtle, it is very important.
Legal custom dominated the numerous general articles
cases of the early 1950s. One of the leading examples of
the invocation of legal custom to decide an Article 134
355
case was United States v. Messenger in 1952. Messenger
was convicted of impersonating an officer, and the Court of
Military Appeals affirmed, holding such impersonation to be
prejudicial to good order and discipline. After referring
to Winthrop " and early case precedent upholding convic-
tions for impersonation under the general articles, the
court concluded: "It requires little imagination to conclude
that a spirit of confusion and disorder, and lack of disci-
pline in the military would result if enlisted personnel
were permitted to assume the role of officers and masquerade
357
as persons of high rank." Impersonation had been tradi-
tionally prosecuted under the general articles and, the
court seemed to suggest, was per se prejudicial to good
order and discipline. The court was apparently not detained
by the specific facts in Messenger's case, which had per-
suaded the Navy Board of Review to hold that he had not,
355
2 CM. A. 21, 6 C.M.R. 21 (1952).
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, at 726.




under the circumstances, committed an offense.
Messenger did not intend to deceive anyone about his rank,
and the impersonation was apparent on its face. Everyone
who saw Messenger knew he was not an officer, and there
was no appreciable publicity attendant to the impersonation.
In short, it was nothing more than an office prank. None-
theless, the Court of Military Appeals considered such
exculpatory factors to be irrelevant, and held that the
offense of impersonation requires neither an intent to gain
any benefit from the impersonation, not actual deception
of another person.
In some of the early cases under the Uniform Code,
legal custom was invoked by analogy or extension. In United
359States v. Snyder , for example, the Court of Military
Appeals considered whether "wrongful and unlawful attempted
enticement of another member to engage in intercourse with
a woman to be sent to him by the accused" was an offense
under Article 134. The court rejected the accused's con-
tention that his conduct was closely related to "simple
fornication", which, because it involved no discreditable
circumstances and did not directly prejudice good order and
discipline, had customarily not been recognized as a general
articles offense. Instead, the Court characterized Snyder's
358NCM 3-51-S-367 (unreported 1951)
.
359
1 CM. A. 423, C.M.R. 15 (1952) .
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actions as "extremely close" to pandering, which had been
customarily prosecuted as prejudicial conduct. The only
element of pandering missing was financial gain to the
accused, proof of which was not required to sustain the
conviction. The court concluded that Snyder's misconduct
"clearly evinced to his fellow corpsmen a wanton disregard
for a moral standard generally and properly accepted by
society. We certainly cannot say—comparing this act with
others condemned by service custom—that it does not consti-
tute a manifest example of conduct prejudicial to good order
and military discipline." Although the court invoked
"service custom", it was actually referring to military case
precedent punishing pandering, and rejected Snyder's similar
invocation of precedent to characterize his conduct as
legally indistinguishable from discrete, off-duty fornica-
tion with a civilian. Snyder is therefore an example of
legal custom allowing the judicial recognition of a novel
general articles offense: fixing someone up with a hot
date.
In some of the early cases, legal customs of the
361
several services conflicted. In United States v. Kirchner
the Court of Military Appeals had to choose between the legal
custom of the Army to prosecute negligent homicide as a
general articles offense and the Navy's absence of such a
360
Id., 4 C.M.R. at 19.
361
1 CM. A. 477, 4 C.M.R. 69 (1952).
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practice. Kirchner, a Marine, contended that his convic-
tion was improper because since he was a member of the
Marine Corps, the customs of the Department of the Navy
governed. While the court agreed that "it is true, as
argued by the defense, that Article 134, supra, must be
interpreted in light of existing service customs and
"36 2
usages", it was not limited to the precedents of the
accused's branch of servie, especially since all the ser-
vices now operated under a common body of criminal law, the
Uniform Code. Citing Winthrop and earlier Army cases, as
well as the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial— the first
applicable to all the services— the court ruled that negli-
gent homicide was an Article 134 offense, under either
362
Id., 4 C.M.R. at 70
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prejudicial conduct or service discrediting theories.
One commentator has sharply criticized the legal
custom approach taken by the Court of Military Appeals in
the early 1950s. According to James Hagan, it usurped the
prerogatives of the court-martial, which had been empowered
by Congress to determine "apparently without limitation to
any previously recognized and punishable offense" whether
the conduct in each case was prejudicial to good order and
discipline, service discrediting, or unbecoming an officer
364
and a gentleman. Hagan viewed such reliance on case
•3 C "i
Other examples of the invocation of legal custom
in early Art. 133 and Art. 134 cases include: United States
v. Eagleson, 3 CM. A. 685, 14 C.M.R. 103 (1954) (reckless
driving); United States v. Long, 2 CM. A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60
(1952) (assaulting a witness) ; United States v. Herndon, 1
CM. A. 461, 4 C.M.R. 53 (1952) (receiving stolen property) ;
United States v. Downard, 1 C.M.R. 405 (A.B.R. 1951) , rev'd
on other grounds , 1 CM. A. 346, 3 C.M.R. 80 (1952) (beating
and using abusive, obscene language to one's wife at an
officers' club); United States v. Andrews, 9 C.M.R. 667
(A.B.R. 1953), petition for review denied , 3 CM. A. 815, 10
C.M.R. 159 (1953) (wrongful cohabitation) ; United States v.
Yamat, 8 C.M.R. 356 (A.B.R. 1952) (filing false certificate
to obtain payment of a claim)
.
The absence of a legal custom was an important factor in
the following early U.C.M.J. cases, which held that the
specified conduct was not an offense under the general
articles: United States v. Gillin, 8 CM. A. 669, 25 C.M.R.
173 (1958) (automobile held not to be, as a matter of law,
the subject of an unlawful entry under Article 134) ; United
States v. Wasluski, 6 CM. A. 724, 21 C.M.R. 46 (1956) (pas-
senger fleeting scene of an accident) ; United States v.
Kirksey, 6 CM. A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955) (negligent fail-
ure to pay just debts); United States v. Downard, 6 CM. A.
538, 20 C.M.R. 254, 257 (1955) (negligent failure to main-
tain sufficient funds in checking account not established
as an offense in "that which might roughly be called the
common law of the military establishment) ; United States v.
Lefort, 15 C.M.R. 596 (C.CB.R. 1954) (possession of
narcotics paraphenalia)
.
Hagan, supra note 23, at 87.
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precedent as being contrary to the fundamental nature of
military common law:
These decisions disclose a search by the appellate
bodies into prior practice, custom, state law, and
common law concepts of crimes and defenses, or a
reliance on the Manual provisions, to ascertain
whether the conduct amounts to a violation of the
article. The fact that the court-martial supposedly
found sufficient nexus between the conduct and its
effect to characterize it as a "disorder and neglect"
or a "service discredit" has been of little or no
importance in determining whether the conduct amounts
to an offense. 365
The reliance by appellate courts on legal custom in
general articles cases, rather than habitually deferring to
the factual determination of the court-martial members'
role. Between 1917 and 1951 the influence of the Manuals
,
Digests of Opinions , and treatises had steadily grown as
members of courts-martial, without any legal training or
instruction, turned to them for guidance.
The Manual for Courts-Martial and its Navy counter-
part, Naval Courts and Boards, gave an aura of official
sanction to the examples of general articles offenses
discussed therein. Both publications contained the offi-
cial Table of Maximum Punishments, which listed the maximum
punishments authorized for various offenses, as prescribed
by the President. As new offenses were recognized by mil-
itary courts, many of them would be listed in subsequent
tables, in the textual discussions of the general articles,





listed 48 offenses under the general artilces in its Table
of Maximum Punishments. By 1949, the number had jumped
to more than 70. Naval Courts and Boards listed 36 of-
fenses under A.G.N. 22 in the table in its 1917 edition, and
o c o
137 in its 1937 version. Even though many of the offenses
formerly presecuted under the general articles have been
codified as separate punitive articles under the Uniform
369Code, the current Manual for Courts-Martial lists 73
distinct general articles offenses in its Table of Maximum
r. u 370Punishments
.
366M.C.M., 1917, para. 349, at 165-67.
367M.C.M., 1949, para. 117c, at 138-142. It should be
noted that the 1949 Manual
, the last one applicable only to
the Army, was the only major revision of the Manual for
Courts -Martial since 1928. The Judge Advocate General of
the Army explained that the changes incorporated in 1949
were "indicated by experience during the twenty years since
the promulgation of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928,
particularly that gained during World War II." Id. at vii.
368Naval Courts and Boards, 1917, sec. 390, at 222-
224; Naval Courts and Boards, 1937, sec. 457, at 237-240.
Most of the offenses listed in the 1937 edition were civil-
ian federal crimes which, as in the Army, were punishable
under the general article.
369
E.g., conspiracy, not prohibited by Art. 81, U.C.M.J.,
10 U.S.C. sec. 881; assault with a dangerous weapon, now Art.
128, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. sec. 928; assault upon a commissioned
officer, now Art. 128, U.C.M.J., sec. 928; bad check offenses,
now Art. 123A, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. sec. 923A; drunken or reck-
less driving, now Art. Ill, U.C.M.J., sec. 911; wrongful appro-
priation, now Art. 121, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. sec. 921.
370M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), para. 127c, at 25-15 through
25-17. The current Table of Maximum Punishments lists no
unbecoming conduct offenses. The maximum authorized punish-
ment is that provided for the most closely related offense
listed in the table under another punitive article. If no
listed offense is closely related, the court must then turn
to the Title 18 of the U.S. Code to find a closely related
offense, and applies the punishment provided.
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The Manuals and their naval counterparts also set out
sample specifications for the more common general articles
offenses. These were intended to allow clerks, legal offi-
cers, and court-martial members--all of whom were not
usually lawyers--to draft specifications and findings that
were in proper form and alleged all the necessary elements
of each offense. V7inthrop, for example, listed three sample
371
specifications for unbecoming conduct and seven for
. . 372prejudicial conduct, all of which were taken from actual
cases. By 1917, the number of unbecoming conduct specifi-
cations had grown to nine, and 51 samples were given for
373general articles offenses under A.W. 96. The 1949 Manual
listed six samples for unbecoming conduct, substantially
unchanged from 1917, but the samples for prejudicial and
374
service discrediting conduct had increased to 74. The
current Manual lists four sample specifications for unbecoming
371
W. Winthrop, supra note 49, app. XX, at 1021-1022.
Winthrop's samples reflected the tone of military service in
the post-Civil War years: false report of an unsuccessful
expedition against hostile Indians; dishonorable failure to
pay just debts; and violation of a formal pledge not to drink.
372
Id . at 1022, alleging: absence leave; neglect of
duty in a battle against Indians; disorderly conduct and
fighting with another officer in the presence of enlisted
men; abusing one's horse; negligently allowing prisoners
to escape; and fraudulent enlistment.
M.C.M., 1917, app. 4, at 335-352A. The Indians
had retreated to the reservation and out of the sample
specifications, thus closing a colorful chapter in the his-
tory of military law; but Winthrop's abused horse survived.
374
M.C.M., 1949, app. 4, at 327-333.
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conduct, and 62 samples for Article 134 offenses.
Because the Manuals and Naval Courts and Boards were
relatively comprehensive, highly practical guides to mili-
tary law and court-martial procedure, they were—and to
some extent still are
—
given more weight in matters of
substantive law than was strictly warranted. The Presi-
dent's authority to set the maximum authorized punishment
for offenses carrying no stated punishment in the Articles
of War and Articles for the Government of the Navy was
derived from his constitutional powers as Commander in
377Chief. The legal effect of the various Executive Orders
prescribing maximum punishments was procedural, not sub-
stantive; for the Executive Orders could not actually create
new offenses under the general articles. Instead, the
Tables of Maximum Punishments and the sample specifications
merely referred to offenses already recognized by military
courts as punishable under military common law. In matters
of substantive law the Manuals were, and still are, of no
more legal effect than any learned treatise on criminal
M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), app . 6c, at A6-20, alleging:
dishonorably copying or using another's examination paper;
drunk or disorderly in uniform to the disgrace of the armed
forces; dishonorable failure to pay just debts; and dis-
honorable failure to keep a promise to pay a debt.
Id. at A6-20 through A6-26. Winthrop's abused
horse lives on in sample 126, "abusing a public animal."
377




Technical niceties aside, over the years the Manuals
nonetheless assumed a dominant role in substantive military
law. Military courts habitually deferred to the Manuals in
379
substantive issues. Although such habitual adherence to
the Manuals has triggered close appellate scrutiny of novel
380general articles offenses, it has not always restricted
"the very broad reach of the literal language of the arti-
cles" to the extent the Supreme Court suggested in Parker
3 7 8
For a recent application of this doctrine to the
military law of mental responsibility, see United States v.
Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (CM. A. 1977), which invalidated the
M ' Nagh ten- irres is table impulse rule of M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.),
para. 120, and substituted the A.L.I. Model Penal Code
standard.
379While usually expressing a preference for the
Manual '
s
substantive rules, military courts have carefully
avoided characterizing them as binding. See , e.g., United
States v. Kunak, 5 CM. A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346, 369, 370 (1954);
United States v. Smith, 5 CM. A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
Sample specifications cannot create offenses. United States
v. Waluski, 6 CM. A. 724, 21 C.M.R. 46, 53 (1956) (passenger
leaving the scene of an accident) . Samples that fail to
allege all the elements of an offense are invalid. United
States v. Brice, 48 C.M.R. 368 (N. C.M.R. 1973) (riot)
.
380 See , e.g., United States v. Regan, 11 M.J. 745
(A. C.M.R. 1981) (falsely identifying self, throwing butter
on the ceiling of a mess hall, and discharging Claymore mine
before given the proper command); United States v. Caballero,
23 CM. A. 304, 49 C.M.R. 594, 596 (1975) (possession of
narcotics paraphenalia) ; United States v. Davis, 27 C.M.R.
908 (C.G.B.R. 1956) (removing fuses from fuse box) . See
generally
, Lewis, Limitations Upon Prosecutions of Offenses
Under Article 134 , 9 A.F. JAG L. Rev. 35, 38-39 (1967). Cf.
Cutts, Article 134 : Vague or Valid ?, 15 A.F. JAG L. Rev.
129, 142 (1974), which presents perhaps an exaggerated view
of the Manual '
s
role: "The author is firmly convinced that
anyone wanting to know what is prohibited by Article 134
need only open the MCM...It is Article 134 complete with






v. Levy . To the contrary, the tendency to accept the
listing of certain conduct in the Manual as making all such
conduct per se prejudicial to good order and discipline,
service discrediting, or unbecoming an officer expanded
their reach by allowing convictions under the general arti-
cles of conduct that, under the specific circumstances, may
not have actually been prejudicial, unbecoming, or service
discrediting. This does not appear to be so much the
result of a conscious usurpation by appellate courts of the
court-martial ' s prerogatives, nor of an intellectually
slovenly abdication of authority by the court-martial, but
merely the natural consequences of relying on the consider-
able body of case precedent that had developed by the end
of World War II, to the frequent exclusion of the factual
analysis of each case that early court-martial practice
contemplated
.
C . Custom Restored :
The Return to Societal Custom
Societal custom is common law custom as it was used
in nineteenth century military law. Courts-martial referred
to the values, norms, folkways, and traditions of military
society to establish standards of conduct, such as those
expected of officers, and to identify conduct that jeopar-
dized discipline or discredited the service. Although in
the first half of the twentieth century societal custom was
JblParker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 754.
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gradually supplanted by legal custom in determining whether
the accused's conduct in a given case was punishable under
the general articles, since 1957 military law has returned
to the nineteenth century concept and use of custom.
By the early 19 50, the prosecution was not required
in a general articles case to plead or prove that, as a
factual matter, the accused's conduct was prejudicial to
good order and discipline, service discrediting, or unbe-
coming. Such descriptive language was "nothing more than
traditionally permissible surplussage" that added nothing
38 2
to the legal effect of the specification. Nor was such
language an element of the offense that had to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, offenses such as drunkenness
383 384 385
on base, indecent exposure, carnal knowledge,
386 387 388bigamy, false swearing, and negligent homicide
United States v. Marker, 1 CM. A. 393, 3 C.M.R.
127, 134 (1952) .
383United States v. Wahl, 5 C.M.R. 733 (A.B.R. 1952),
petition for review denied , 2 CM. A. 677, 6 C.M.R. 130
(1953)
.
384 United States v. Anderson, 8 C.M.R. 212 (A.B.R.
1952), petition for review denied , 2 CM. A. 675, 8 C.M.R.
178 (1953)
.
385United States v. Deese, 3 C.M.R. (AF) 307 (A.F.B.R.
1950)
.
386United States v. Weber, 13 C.M.R. 176 (A.B.R. 1953)
387United States v. Galloway, 8 C.M.R. 323 (A.B.R.
1952), aff'd, 2 CM. A. 433, 9 C.M.R. 63 (1953).
United States v. Robinson, 12 C.M.R. 860 (A.F.B.R,




were held to be per se prejudicial to good order and
discipline, or service discrediting, or both.
However, in 1957 the Court of Military Appeals, in
38 9United States v. Williams , held that the prejudicial
nature of the accused's conduct is a factual element of an
Article 134 prejudicial conduct offense. The government
had contended that Williams' unlawful use of narcotics was
prejudicial to good order and discipline as a matter of law,
and therefore this did not have to be pleaded, instructed
upon, or established beyond reasonable doubt. While the
court agreed that the language "to the prejudice of good
order and discipline" need not be alleged in the specifi-
cation, it was nonetheless a factual element of the offense
that must be instructed upon by the law officer. United
390States v. Grosso , decided the same year, and United
391States v. Gittens in 19 58 appeared to end the notion
that some conduct could be prejudicial, service discred-
iting, or unbecoming as a matter of law.
The effect of the Will jams -Grosso-Gittens line of
cases was to return to the nineteenth century practice of
the court-martial determining whether the accused's conduct
was within the scope of the general articles. As summa-
rized in the concurring opinion in United States v. Hunt;
389
8 CM. A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957).
390
7 CM. A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957).
391
8 CM. A. 673, 25 C.M.R. 177 (1958) .
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In effect, when we submit the question of whether the
accused's conduct was service discrediting to the
court as an element of the offense, we are reverting
to the practice of an earlier time when the members of
a court-martial were the judges of both the facts and
the law of a case arising under either of the general
articles. Under such a doctrine an act is service
discrediting whenever a court-martial and a convening
authority consider it so... 292
After 1957, then, general articles law returned to an
emphasis on the facts and circumstances of the case as the
predicate for liability under Articles 133 and 134 rather
than legal custom or precedent. Military appellate courts
began to demonstrate renewed deference to the convictions
handed down by courts-martial in general articles cases,
which now implied a factual finding beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused's conduct satisfied the "terminal element"
393
of Article 133 or 134. In United States v. Rowe, for
example, the Court of Military Appeals declined to overturn
a conviction for service discrediting conduct arising out
of the accused's failure, in violation of a North Carolina
statute, to render assistance to his wife when she was
injured in an automobile accident. The court stated that
in order to be punishable under Article 134, a violation of
state law must "in fact, and in law" be conduct of a nature
to discredit the armed forces. Because the court-martial
could have reasonably found, based on the evidence in the
392 27 C.M.R. 557, 560 (A.B.R. 1958) (Crook, J. A.,
concurring)
.
393 13 CM. A. 302, 32 C.M.R. 302 (1962)
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case, that Rowe's conduct was service discrediting, the
394Court of Military Appeals would not disturb the conviction.
Another example of such deference to the court-martial '
s
395findings was United States v. Winton , in which a convic-
tion under Article 134 for submitting a forged recommendation
for a loan to a credit institution was affirmed on the
grounds that the court-martial could have reasonably found
such conduct, under the circumstances, to be service discred-
396lting.
The view that some misconduct is so aggravated as to
be, as a matter of law, prejudicial, service discrediting,
or unbecoming has died a lingering death. Occasionally,
even recently, military courts have discussed general arti-
cles offenses in terms and tones that suggest a reliance on
legal custom and a per se characterization of the accused's
conduct rather than a careful scrutiny of the circumstances
to determine if the specific acts are prejudicial, service
discrediting, or unbecoming.
One of the more puzzling cases in this regard was
397United States v. Hooper, decided in 1958. Hooper, a
394 Id., 32 C.M.R. at 308.
395 15 CM. A. 222, 35 C.M.R. 194 (1965).
Cf. United States v. Wilson, 13 CM. A. 670, 33
C.M.R. 202 (1963), in which similar conduct was held not
violative of Art. 134 because the forged statement was not
actually communicated to a third party.
397
9 CM. A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958).
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retired rear admiral, was convicted of sodomy, unbecoming
conduct, and service discrediting conduct arising out of
his "publicly associating with persons known to be sexual
deviates". The Court of Military Appeals, per Chief Judge
Quinn, brushed aside Hooper's contention that since his
homosexual liaisons occurred in private and were discrete,
his conduct lacked the notoriety necessary to convict one
of unbecoming conduct arising out of sexual misconduct.
"The capacity of such association to dishonor or disgrace
the accused as an individual, and seriously compromise his
standing as an officer is patent", the Chief Judge con-
39 8
eluded. The court rejected a similar contention on the
issue of service discredit, noting that Hooper's conduct
was observed by law enforcement agents, one of whom was a
woman, who had him under surveillance. Therefore these
39 9
could not be considered private, non-discreditable acts.
398 Id., 26 C.M.R. at 427.
399 Robinson 0. Everett, writing the year after Hooper
was decided commented : "One thing especially disturbing
about this opinion is its implication that conduct not
otherwise service discrediting can become service discred-
iting because it is discovered by investigators and, there-
fore, is no longer completely private. There are very few
parallels for holding that behavior becomes criminal simply
because the policeman is alert enough to 'catch someone in
the act'." Everett, supra note 22, at 145. Cf . United
States v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R. 890 (A.F.B.R. 1966) , petition for
review denied 16 CM. A. 655, 36 C.M.R. 541 (1966), in which,
after a careful analysis of the facts of the case, charges
arising from visiting and escorting enlisted men to a gay
bar were held not unbecoming or service discrediting conduct,
but specifications alleging a continued, notorious homosexual
relationship and homosexual acts were affirmed.
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Other post-1957 examples of general articles cases
suggesting a per se approach to an accused's conduct include
United States v. Caballero , in which possession of nar-
cotics paraphenalia was held as a matter of law not punish-
401
able as prejudicial conduct, and United States v. Kick
,
which reaffirmed negligent homicide as an Article 134
offense. Kick was strongly based on "service customs"
which turned out to be, in Chief Judge Fletcher's opinion
for the court, extensive legal precedent and a general need
to protect military members from negligence in the handling
of dangerous instrumentalities that is commonplace in mili-
i-4= 402tary life.
"Custom" therefore still remains something of a con-
fused concept in the appellate military courts. Although,
as will be seen in the novel-offenses cases discussed later,
"custom" is more frequently used in its common law, societal
sense. Yet there are cases such as Kick in which custom is
still confused with case precedent. At the trial level,
400 23 CM. A. 304, 49 C.M.R. 594 (1975).
401
7 M.J. 82 (CM. A. 1979) . A second issue in Kick
was whether Congress had preempted prosecution of negligent
homicide under Art. 134 by enacting Arts. 118 (murder) and
119 (manslaughter) . The court found no evidence of a Con-
gressional intent to preempt the field of homicide by en-
acting Arts. 118 and 119. Id., 7 M.J. at 84-87.
402 Id., 7 M.J. at 84. See also United States v. Mayne,
39 C.M.R. 628, 629-30 (A.B.R. 1968) (acceptance of loan
solicited at accused's request from subordinates per se




however, the requirement that the accused's conduct must, as
a factual matter, be found to be prejudicial, discrediting,
or unbecoming has forced courts-martial to return to the use
of societal custom that was the foundation of nineteenth
century general articles law.
The return to societal custom has had two significant
consequences. First, returning the decision of whether the
accused's conduct is punishable under the general articles
to the "practical men" of the court-martial has reinforced
the "separate society" tradition, which during the 1960s
403
and 1970s had come under heavy attack. The second result
has been to reopen the possibility for the same type of
expansion of the scope of the general articles that occurred
between the Civil War and World War I. No longer constrained
by legal custom, courts-martial are once again free to impose
punishment for novel general articles offenses by applying,
in common law fashion, customs of the service to specific
conduct. On the other hand, this expansive potential has
been checked somewhat, especially since Parker v. Levy, by
appellate skepticism.
403See supra note 58. The "separate society" has be-
come a commonly invoked rationale for a wide range of judi-
cial decisions concerning the rights of military personnel.
See , e.g_., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356-57 (1980)
right to circulate petitions); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 837-38 (1976) (right to conduct Presidential campaign
activities on base); Cortright v. Resor, 447 F. 2d 245, 246,
255 (2d Cir. 1971) (transfers of military personnel following
anti-war activity) ; United States v. Middleton, 10 M.J. 123
(CM. A. 1981) (search and seizure) .
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D. Custom and Novel Offenses
The consideration of novel general articles offenses
is perhaps the best modern demonstration of custom at work
in military law. Since the enactment of the Uniform Code
a number of cases have imposed criminal liability under the
general articles for conduct that was neither mentioned in
the Manual for Courts-Martial nor recognized by case prece-
dent. Among these are such diverse and sometimes exotic
misbehavior as: misrepresenting oneself to be a physician
in order to induce enlisted wives to consent to a "physical
..
404 ... , . . .. . . 405
exam ; setting fire to a commode seat in the barracks;
burning a building with intent to defraud an insurer;
407
window peeping at a trailer park; showing stag movies to
the troops; being found in flagrante derelicto with an
United States v. Reed, 9 C.M.R. 396 (A.B.R. 1953),
petition for review denied , 3 CM. A. 810, 10 C.M.R. 159
(1953)
.
405United States v. Evans, 10 M.J. 829 (A. C.M.R. 1981),
petition for review denied , 11 M.J. 350 (1981).
406United States v. Fuller, 9 CM. A. 145, 25 C.M.R.
405 (1958)
.
407United States v. Clark, 22 C.M.R. 888 (A.F.B.R.
1956), petition for review denied , 7 CM. A. 790, 22 C.M.R.
331 (1956)
408United States v. White, 37 C.M.R. 791 (A.F.B.R.





enlisted man's wife; borrowing from an enlisted man;
* • 4-' 411and group fornication.
By far the leading novel offense case is United States
412
v. Sadinsky, decided by the Court of Military Appeals in
1964. Sadinsky was convicted under Article 134 for delib-
erately and wrongfully jumping into the sea from the flight
deck of the aircraft carrier USS INTREPID. The Navy Board
of Review disapproved the conviction, holding that the
specification failed, as a matter of law, to allege an
413
offense under the Uniform Code. The Judge Advocate
General of the Navy certified the case to the Court of
414Military Appeals pursuant to Article 67 of the Code.
Sadinsky is a good example of the Court of Military
Appeals deferring to the judgment of the court-martial.
The court noted that the pleadings and the facts in the
case eliminated any possibility that Sadinsky had slipped,
409United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (A.B.R. 1952),
petition for review denied , 1 CM. A. 712, 4 C.M.R. 173 (1952)
410 United States v. Calderon, 24 C.M.R. 338 (A.B.R.
1957)
.
United States v. Berry, 6 CM. A. 609, 20 C.M.R.
325 (1956).
412
14 CM. A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964).
413NCM 63-01488 (unreported 1963)
.
414Art. 67(b)(2), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C sec. 867(b)(2),
authorizes what is tantamount to a government appeal from
decisions of the Courts of Military Review.
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stumbled, fallen, or was pushed, off the flight deck. In
fact, he had done a backflip. Moreover, Sadinsky had
performed his stunt pursuant to a bet with his shipmates,
whom he instructed to report that he had slipped off the
edge. The incident occurred near nightfall, while the
INTREPID was underway in heavy seas and was preparing for
night air operations. Given such considerations, the court
would not disturb the Navy court-martial * s finding that
such conduct, under its circumstances, was prejudicial to
good order and discipline.
Another outstanding novel offense case was the 1957
415decision in United States v. Holt . Holt and his buddies
operated a crooked bingo game at the recreation center of
an Air Force base in France. He was convicted, inter alia
,
under Article 134 of wrongfully and unlawfully awarding
bingo prizes to his confederates by calling false bingo
numbers, and of receiving compensation for calling such
false numbers. In a very insightful opinion, the Air Force
Board of Review affirmed the conviction, holding that Holt's
conduct violated Article 134 under either a prejudicial
conduct theory or a service discredit theory. Rejecting the
defense contention that any prejudice or discrediting ten-
dency was too remote to constitute an offense, and that
there was no precedent in military law for such convictions,
415 20 C.M.R. 718 (A.F.B.R. 1956), aff 'd , 7 CM. A. 617,




the Air Force Board of Review provided the following expla-
nation of the role of custom in shaping the scope of the
general articles
:
[A] s the morals, laws, customs, usages, culture,
organization and administration of a country or
military service change, so also do those acts which
are prejudicial or discrediting thereto... So, also,
as the country and services change, the future will
no doubt bring forth many violations of Article 134
which are not recognized today. So also, service
sponsored bingo games are a relatively new activity
in the Armed Forces, and the fact that prejudicial
or discreditable acts resulting therefrom have not
heretofore been characterized as military offenses
is of little or no consequence. 416
The issue was not one of legal custom or precedent but
rather whether the facts of the case, and those reasonably
inferable therefrom, specified conduct directly and palpably
prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to
discredit the Armed Forces. "[T]he accused's acts are
tainted with a breach of trust, dishonesty, lying and
cheating in a specific and precise manner and concerning a
. . 417
recognized welfare activity of the Armed Forces."
The absence of a service custom can also be important
in a novel offense case. One of the best examples of an
41!
unsuccessful search for custom is United States v. Waluski .
The accused, a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident
in which a foreign national was killed, was convicted, inter
Id. , 20 C.M.R. at 725.
417 id.
418
6 CM. A. 724, 21 C.M.R. 46 (1956).

146
alia, of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of
Article 134. While the Court of Military Appeals had no
doubt that a driver's fleeing the scene can clearly dis-
419
credit the service, did a passenger's flight have the
same consequence? The answer, according to Chief Judge
Quinn, was to be found in service custom: "Ancient military
customs can create standards of conduct. A violation of
420these standards is punishable under the general article."
No such service custom with respect to passengers could be
found, although Judge Latimer, concurring in the result,
would have found such a custom with respect to the senior
officer present, riding as a passenger on a trip with an
421
"air of officiality". Waluski's conviction under Arti-
422
cle 134 was therefore disapproved.
419
Id., 21 C.M.R. at 53. The court clearly adopted a
per se view of a military driver fleeing the scene of an
accident, citing United States v. Eagleson, 3 CM. A. 685,
14 C.M.R. 103 (1954)
.
420 United States v. Waluski, 21 C.M.R. at 53.
421
Id. , 21 C.M.R. at 55 (Latimer, J., concurring in
the result). Waluski was not, however, the senior officer
present.
422See also
, e.g., United States v. Smart, 12 C.M.R.
826 (A.F.B.R. 1953) (because of lack of governing service
custom, being in the day room in the women's barracks at
3:00 A.M. not prejudicial to good order and discipline).
Cf. United States v. Adams, 21 C.M.R. 733 (A.F.B.R. 1956)
in which the accused was convicted of seven specifications
of attempting to induce another airman to commit an act of
masturbation, in violation of Art. 134. The Board agreed
with Adam's contention that there was no custom of the ser-
vice that had the force of law concerning masturbation; but
it distinguished the act of enticing others to masturbate,
which was customarily viewed as demonstrating a "wanton




There has hardly been a flood of novel offenses in
recent years; and appellate military courts have demonstrated
caution and skepticism in reviewing novel offense convictions
423In United States v. Caballero / for example, the Court of
Military Appeals disapproved a conviction under Article 134
for "wrongful possession of narcotic paraphenalia, to-wit a
syringe and needle" when such possession was not prohibited
by an order or regulation. The court viewed the then-recent
decision in Parker v. Levy as an implicit charge to military
law not to stray far beyond the range of offenses listed in
the Manual :
In recently holding that Article 134 of the Code is
not void for vagueness under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, a majority of the Supreme
Court placed great significance upon the fact that
this Court and other military authorities have con-
sidered the article in such a manner as to at least
partially narrow its otherwise broad scope and to
supply considerable specificity by way of examples
of covered conduct. In drawing attention to the
decisions of this Court as well as the more than 60
sample specifications in the Manual, a majority of
the Supreme Court found a "substantial range of
conduct" to which Article 134 applies" without
vagueness or imprecision. 424
The Court of Military Appeals found no case precedent
for Caballero 's conviction, and the offense was not listed
or otherwise described in the Manual . The court rejected
the government's forceful argument about the extent and
severity of drug abuse in the military, and its obvious
423 23 CM. A. 304, 49 C.M.R. 594 (1975).
4




impact on discipline, morale, and readiness. This consid-
eration obviously was the driving force behind the court-
martial 's finding of guilty. Instead, the court held, as
a matter of law, that mere possession of a syringe, in the
absence of a lawful order prohibiting it, presented only a
425potential harm, not direct and palpable prejudice.
Two Court of Military Review cases since Caballero
demonstrate the close appellate scrutiny to which novel
offense convictions are scrutinized. In United States v.
426Linyear the Navy Court of Military Review held that
calling a woman a "swine" was not an Article 134 offense,
but avoided deciding the case on a novel offense basis.
Instead the court treated the case as raising an issue of
427insufficiency of proof of the long-recognized offense of
communicating "indecent, insulting, or obscene language" to
a female or a child. The court held that the word "swine"
did not communicate the "libidinous message" that was an
element of the offense.
425The author suspects that the court's uncharacter-
istic overtuning of the court-martial ' s findings in Caballero
may have been influenced by an understandable reluctance to
expand the scope of the general articles in the first novel
offense case to be decided after Parker v. Levy . The author
is firmly convinced that, given the change in membership on
the Court of Military Appeals since 1975 and the court's
marked change in philosophy, Caballero would be decided
differently today.
426
3 M.J. 1027 (N.C.M.R. 1977), petition for review
denied
, 5 M.J. 269 (1978)
.
427See Table of Maximum Punishments, M.C.M. 1969
(Rev.), para. 127c, at 25-16.
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The Army Court of Military Review, in United States
428 . .
v. Regan , considered a conviction under Article 134 for
throwing butter on a mess-hall ceiling, to which the accused
had pled guilty. On appeal he contended that his guilty
plea was improvident because the specification did not
429
allege an offense under the Code. After noting that
butter throwing was not an offense mentioned in the Manual
or recognized by case precedent, the court held that there
was insufficient evidence of prejudice to good order and
discipline to sustain the conviction. The court believed
that such a holding was compelled Parker v. Levy , which
"emphasizes that the conduct prosecuted must be recognized
readily as being criminal and must have a direct and imme-
430diate adverse impact upon discipline." Judge Lewis
vigorously dissented, arguing that under the circumstances
of the case there could be no possible legitimate explana-
431tion for the accused's acts.
432
In United States v. Evans , however, the Army Court
of Military Review had no difficulty in approving the
428 11 M.J. 745 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
429 For some unknown reason the trial counsel amended
the specification, which originally alleged disorderly con-
duct under Art. 134, by deleting all the words necessary to
plead disorderly conduct, but without substituting any




Id . at 746-47 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
432
10 M.J. 829 (A.C.M.R. 1981)
,
petition for review
denied, 11 M.J. 348 (1981).
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accused's Article 134 conviction for setting fire to a
toilet seat in an occupied barracks. Such conduct suffi-
ciently affected the "condition of tranquility, security,
433
and good order and discipline. Evans' misconduct was
therefore a distinct, lesser-included offense of simple
arson, which is prohibited by Article 126.
In summary, custom continues to serve as a source of
substantive law under the general articles as the military
courts, from time to time, recognize new offenses. Custom
can limit the application of the general articles in situ-
ations where the extent of prejudice, service discredit, or
compromise of one's position as an officer is slight; but
it also provides a source of hitherto unknown general arti-
cles offense. Characterizing the issue of prejudice, dis-
crediting tendency, or unbecoming nature in the accused's
misconduct as a factual issue decided at trial has restored
the court-martial to its central role as the arbiter of
what conduct falls under the general articles. The renewed
role of the court-martial in determining, as a factual
matter, the applicability of the general articles to a
specific case has been balanced, especially since Parker v.
Levy , by close appellate scrutiny of novel offense convic-
tions. Overall, however, the principal effect of custom in
general articles law under the Uniform Code has been to
Id. at 830, citing United States v. Snyder, 1 CM. A,
423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952)
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retain a nineteenth century fluidity to the substantive




When the role of custom in military law is viewed in
a historical perspective, many of the fundamental assump-
tions made about the general articles are called into ques-
tion. As this thesis was intended to suggest, the true
meaning and nature of the general articles can only be
fully understood in light of the 800 years of legal evolu-
tion they incorporate into the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Since 1951 military courts have frequently asserted
434that "the General Article is not... a catchall". Yet
the historic purpose of military common law, to punish
conduct violative of customary notions of discipline and
personal behavior, speaks eloquently that the general arti-
cles were indeed, intended to be catchalls, to preserve
under the codal systems of military law the ancient pre-
rogative of the court-martial to define and punish miscon-
duct according to the customs of the service.
Much of the misunderstanding of the role of custom in
general articles law today results from the two distinct
meanings and functions of custom in contemporary military
law. The view of custom underlying Parker v. Levy is
434




clearly legal custom, which has generally had a limiting
effect on the reach of the general articles. However, to
the extent that reliance on legal custom has resulted in
certain conduct being characterized as per se prejudicial,
unbecoming, or service-discrediting, notwithstanding the
circumstances of each case, legal custom has also extended
the reach of the general articles to cases that perhaps
would not have resulted in convictions under nineteenth
century practice.
The function of societal custom is more basic to the
development and operation of the general articles and is
more frequently overlooked or misunderstood. Having
returned to the historic practice of treating the question
of whether the accused's conduct was prejudicial, service-
discrediting, or unbecoming as a factual issue for the
court-martial to decide, modern court-martial members have
resumed their nineteenth century roles, which Chief Judge
Everett has described as "the ultimate arbiters of what is
435
service discrediting or prejudicial to good order."
It is the ability of courts-martial to give legal
effect to societal custom and, in common law fashion, to
apply it to new factual contexts that provides the elastic-
ity that has long been characteristic of general articles
law. To the extent that societal custom allows the recog-
nition of new offenses under Articles 133 and 134, it is
435Everett, supra note 22, at 154.
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hardly the limiting or narrowing force that Justice
Rehnquist assumed it to be in Parker v. Levy . Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist seems to have overlooked the societal
aspect of service custom entirely.
In his dissent in Parker v. Levy . Justice Stewart
insightfully pointed out the inherent ineffectiveness of
custom in defining and restricting the substantive scope of
the conduct they prohibit. To rely on legal custom, as
embodied in the Manuals, treatises, and case precedent, is
to rely on explanations of military common law that are
themselves frequently generalized and vague. The invocation
of societal custom, which in Dynes v. Hoover was considered
436to be "well known by practical men in the navy and army,"
may now involve giving legal effect to values and norms no
longer generally known and invariably observed by those
437
supposedly subject to their operation. Times and the
character of military society change. As Justice Stewart
mused:
It might well have been true in 1858 or even 1902 that
those in the armed services knew, through a combination
of military custom and instinct, what sorts of acts
fell within the purview of the general articles. But
436 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 82, quoted
in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 747.
437
Davis, supra note 15, at 11. The issue is not
merely one involving the discontinued observance of an
antique custom, such as not selling liquor to the Indians,
which, after long disuse loses its legal effect at common
law. Rather, there is a more fundamental question about
the continued utility and fairness of predicating criminal
liability on violations of societal customs of the service
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times have surely changed. Throughout much of this
country's early history, the standing army and navy
numbered in the hundreds. The cadre was small, pro-
fessional, and voluntary. The military was a unique
society, isolated from the mainstream of civilian life,
and it is at least plausible to suppose that the
volunteer in that era understood what conduct was
prohibited by the general articles... To presume that
Levy and others like him who served during the Vietnam
era were so imbued with the ancient traditions of the
military as to comprehend the arcane meaning of the
general articles is to engage in an act of judicial
fantasy .438
In a similar vein, Edward F. Sherman, one of the most
thoughtful commentators on modern military law, has ques-
tioned the continued validity of the separate society
rationale to the extent that it permits criminal liability
to be determined by the court-martial ' s perception of ser-
vice custom:
In a day when most servicemen will not see combat, when
substantial numbers of servicemen live off post and
lead a nine-to-five military existence, and when even
in combat such qualities as initiative, creativity, and
intelligent reaction have replaced the old standard of
blind obedience to orders, military emphasis on obedi-
ence to a rigid and unspecified code of conduct admin-
istered by commanders with criminal sanctions has been
subjected to question. 439
Moreover, Sherman doubts that a consensus about concepts
such as "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman"
. . . 440
still exists within the military community.
The antiquity of military common law does not compel
438 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 781, 782 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)
439Sherman, supra note 19, at 79-80.
440 T , . ,Id. az. 81.
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its continued use in American military justice. Alterna-
tives to the general articles are available and, to a con-
siderable extent, are already being employed. Most of the
crimes and offenses now prosecuted under the general arti-
cles, such as those listed in the Table of Maximum Punish-
ments in the Manual
, could be enacted as additional punitive
articles without enlarging the Uniform Code beyond manage-
able proportions. Others could be covered by the promul-
gation of general orders tailored to meet the special needs
441
of each service. In view of the wide range of adminis-
trative separation from the service, there appears to be
little compelling need to prosecute noncriminal acts as
unbecoming conduct under Article 133. Conduct that vio-
lates another punitive article of the Code could still be
prosecuted without Article 133, provided there is suffi-
cient service connection to allow the exercise of court-
442
martial jurisdiction over the offense.
Repealing the general articles would, however, bring
an end to the role of the court-martial in determining what
conduct is offensive to military common law and in
441The Navy and Marine Corps now prosecute virtually
all drug offenses under Art. 92, U.C.M.J., as violations
of Art. 1151 of Navy Regulations. Art. 1151 incorporates
the substantive provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. sec. 801 et
seq .
442
In modern court-martial practice, an Art. 133
charge is almost always one of several charges arising out




recognizing new offenses. Indeed, it would appear that the
only meaningful argument for retaining the general articles
is to preserve the flexibility that service custom imparts
to military law. Whether the "practical men" of the court-
martial, drawing on their experience and knowledge of mili-
tary custom, should continue to thus define and punish
hitherto unprecedented threats to discipline, reputation,
or decorum is an issue that strikes at the heart of the
separate society tradition.
For 800 years custom has been essentially an expan-
sive force in military common law, providing a flexibility
to military justice that has traditionally been assumed
necessary to preserve discipline. In the past thirty years,
however, there has been a marked judicialization and,
despite howls of protest from some corners of the military
community, a civilianization of military law. No longer is
the court-martial a committee of line officers meeting on
the frontier or at sea, with little or no substantive or
procedural legal guidance. Instead, the modern court-
martial is strikingly similar, in both form and substance,
to a civilian criminal trial--complete with lawyer prosecu-
tors and defense counsels, formal rules of evidence pat-
terned closely after the Federal Rules of Evidence, and an
independent military judge. In light of these altered
historic circumstances, does the unarguable need for flex-
ibility in maintaining discipline necessarily still require
a system of military common law offenses that are defined
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ultimately by service custom?
The separate society is more than just judicial habit
or a convenient rationalization for a "hands-off" judicial
predisposition toward military issues. It also reflects
the way that military people perceive themselves and their
institution. But must the separate society and its legal
system necessarily also be fundamentally different? Not-
withstanding the attractiveness of the separate society
tradition, this remains the great unanswered question
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